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Once more unto the breach, dear friends, once more!

Yup, I've dusted off the Big Honking Database and propose once more to look at One-Run Games in general and the hometown heroes in particular.

This one's for BlueJayWay, obviously.


Before we get to the Blue Jays, we're going to review a few theoretical and data issues. For our purposes here, we're confining ourselves to the years 1900-2015. These are seasons for which I happen to have every team's record in one-run games in handy, easy-to-manipulate form. We're looking at 2414 seasons, which seems like a reasonably large sample. It includes 376,963 games. A lot of baseball. Just how many of those games were decided by a single run? Glad you asked - it's 114,242, which is just over 30 per cent.

The crucial point to understand before looking at one-run games is this: the effect of these games is always, always, always to pull teams towards .500. One run games drag the better teams down towards .500. They lift the bad teams up towards .500. This is the One Run Fundamental. It is a Law of the Game.

Let me break those 2414 seasons into digestible chunks, that you might see this for yourselves.

Since 1900, there have been ten - that's just 10 - teams that have played .700 baseball or better over the course of a season, from the 1902 Pirates to the 2001 Mariners. Those teams played a total of 1530 games, and won 1100 of them. Their overall winning percentage was .719. They played 393 one-run games (just 25.7%), and in those games they went 256-137 - which is a .651 winning percentage. Which is really, really good. But obviously, it's nowhere near .719, and in games that were decided by more than one run, those same ten teams went 844-293. And that's a .742 winning percentage. The overall record was dragged down - and dragged down quite a bit - by their record in close games. They were .091 worse in one-run games than in the rest of their games.

It happens at the top, and it happens at the bottom. There have been twenty teams whose winning percentage couldn't even crack .300, from the 1904 Senators to the 2003 Tigers. Those teams played .276 ball (843-2214) - but they did much better in one run games (331-578, .364) than in the rest of them (512-1636, .238). They were .126 better in one run games. My next group (.300-.349) improved by .095, the next group by .075, and so on and so forth.

And that's the basic pattern. The farther away a team is from .500, the larger the pull effect of one-run games in dragging them back towards .500. Which makes sense on an intuitive level as well. A team as awful as the 2003 Tigers - if by some weird chance they were to win a game, odds are they'd just barely win it. (They actually had a winning record, 19-18, in one-run games. While going a gruesome 24-101 in their other contests.) And similarly, a team as awesome as the 1927 Yankees - if you do manage to beat them, it's probably not going to be by a lot. And Ruth's Yankees went 24-19 in one-run games. They were 86-25 the rest of the time.

Behold! A Data Table!

                                  OVERALL                             ONE-RUN GAMES                            OTHER GAMES        
                                                                           
Record    No. of Teams        GPL    W    L     PCT          GPL     W     L    PCT          GPL    W    L    PCT
                                                                           
.700 plus    10         1,530   1,100    430    .719            393    256    137    .651        1,137    844    293    .742
.650-.699    43        6,556   4,394    2,162    .670          1,931    1,158    773    .600        4,760    3,236    1,389    .700
.625-.649     68        10,576   6,723    3,853    .636          3,106    1,837    1,269    .591        7,470    4,886    2,584    .654
.600-.624    133        20,686  12,651    8,035    .612          6,195    3,488    2,707    .563       14,491    9,163    5,328    .632
.575-.599    199        30,987  18,235   12,752    .588          9,305    5,230    4,075    .562       21,682   13,005    8,677    .600
.550-.574    233        36,253  20,401   15,852    .563         10,983    5,898    5,085    .537       25,270   14,503    10,767    .574
.525-.549    325        51,352  27,572   23,780    .537         15,589    8,103    7,486    .520       35,763   19,469    16,294    .544
.500-.524    258        40,532  20,677   19,855    .510         12,445    6,252    6,193    .502       28,085   14,425    13,662    .514
.475-.499    238        37,403  18,166   19,237    .486         11,472    5,655    5,817    .493       25,931   12,511    13,420    .482
.450-.474    256        39,927  18,439   21,488    .462         12,149    5,792    6,357    .477       27,778   12,647    15,131    .455
.425-.449    202        31,600  13,823   17,777    .437          9,746    4,529    5,217    .465       21,854   9,294    12,560    .425
.400-.424    173        27,129  11,166   15,963    .412          8,157    3,687    4,470    .452       18,972    7,479    11,493    .394
.375-.399    113        17,554   6,800   10,754    .387          5,320    2,253    3,067    .423       12,234    4,547    7,687    .372
.350-.374    62        9,520   3,446    6,074    .362          2,828    1,172    1,656    .414        6,692    2,274    4,418    .340
.300-.349    81        12,500   4,145    8,355    .332          3,712    1,479    2,233    .398        8,788    2,666    6,122    .303
.000-.299    20        3,057     843    2,214    .276            909    331    578    .364        2,148    512    1,636    .238
                                                                           
    2414        377,162 188,581  188,581    .500        114,240   57,120   57,120    .500      263,055  131,461   131,461    0.500

As you can see, the pattern is pretty dependable. The only group that doesn't fit perfectly includes the 133 teams who played between .600 and .624 ball. Those teams had results in one-run games that were just a little bit worse than all this would lead you to expect. They played 6195 one run games, and I would have expected them to win about 3560 of them (roughly .575 ball) - they actually went 3488-2707, which is just .563 ball- in other words, it's exactly the same as the difference between going 93-69 and going 91-71.

This, by the way, is why all the game's greatest and most successful managers have worse records in one-run games than they do the rest of the time. Having a worse record in one-run games than you do in the rest of your games is actually a characteristic of any group of good teams, and those are the types of team that were managed by McCarthy and McGraw and Weaver.

Anyway, that's the pattern, and let me run off a small tangent for the rest of this paragraph. Here's my question - how many games do we need before the sample size becomes large enough for the One Run Fundamental to show itself. It's true that all of these samples behave roughly as you would expect them to. The smallest sample here consists of 10 seasons, 1530 overall games, 393 one-run games. But I still suspect that even that number of games is just a little on the small size.  

I do think we can be pretty damn sure that a single season, and the 30 or 40 one-run games it might include, is nowhere near a large enough sample for the One-Run Fundamental to assert itself - it's about the same as... oh, 30 or 40 at bats over the course of the year. In which anything can happen. It's a little like Josh Donaldson going 5-35 back in May. He's still Josh Donaldson.

So what's the biggest factor in one-run games?

Well, obviously the quality of the team is a pretty large factor. The best teams really do have the best records in one-run games.

But the closer a game gets, the greater the chance that Random Circumstance can determine the outcome. And Luck doesn't know anything about quality. Luck is a flip of a coin, and the odds are the same for everyone. Heads or tails, win or lose, it's 50-50. 

Let's look at the teams that played .700 ball or better. They played .651 ball in one-run games. In an average season, they'd have played about 42 such games, so it's as if they went 27-15 in those games. But we would have expected them to go 31-11, had they played one-run games the same way they played the rest of them. It's almost as if half the games were decided by the team's quality (their .742 winning percentage)  and the other half were decided by a coin flip (which ought to be .500).

Half of the one-run games are effectively decided by a coin flip?

Gulp. Because if you flip that coin 3000 times, you'll surely see heads come up 1500 times. But if you only flip it 30 or 40 times? Weird, weird things can happen.

Which brings us, at last to the Toronto Blue Jays.

From that snowy April day in 1977 through this year's All-Star Break, the Jays have played 6,284 games and they've had a losing record for almost all of that time. (They were briefly above .500 from September 1993 through May 1994, and intemittently after that for the next year. But the franchise has had a losing record every day since May 1995. Not to mention the sixteen years before the second championship.) At this particular moment, they got 3129 wins and 3155 losses, a .498 percentage. We would expect them to have a record in one-run games that's very close to that. Maybe a game or two better.

They don't. They're 874-926 (.486) in one-run games. It's not that big a deal - one more loss, one fewer win every other year or so. Here are the raw numbers:

        ONE-RUN                  OVERALL                    OTHER GAMES

Year    W    L    PCT        W    L    PCT        W     L     PCT         Manager(s)
                                                           
1977    17    27    .386        54    107   .335        37    80    .316        Hartsfield
1978    23    30    .434        59    102   .366        36    72    .333        Hartsfield
1979    19    28    .404        53    109   .327        34    81    .296        Hartsfield
1980    23    21    .523        67    95    .414        44    74    .373        Mattick
1981    10    17    .370        37    69    .349        27    52    .342        Mattick
1982    28    30    .483        78    84    .481        50    54    .481        Cox
1983    25    20    .556        89    73    .549        64    53    .547        Cox
1984    34    25    .576        89    73    .549        55    48    .534        Cox
1985    26    21    .553        99    62    .615        73    41    .640        Cox
1986    22    25    .468        86    76    .531        64    51    .557        Williams
1987    27    24    .529        96    66    .593        69    42    .622        Williams
1988    21    17    .553        87    75    .537        66    58    .532        Williams
1989    25    22    .532        89    73    .549        64    51    .557        Williams-Gaston
1990    24    27    .471        86    76    .531        62    49    .559        Gaston
1991    28    20    .583        91    71    .562        63    51    .553        Gaston-Tenace-Gaston
1992    28    20    .583        96    66    .593        68    46    .596        Gaston
1993    23    22    .511        95    67    .586        72    45    .615        Gaston
1994    13    15    .464        55    60    .478        42    45    .483        Gaston
1995    16    23    .410        56    88    .389        40    65    .381        Gaston
1996    19    22    .463        74    88    .457        55    66    .455        Gaston
1997    29    30    .492        76    86    .469        47    56    .456        Gaston-Queen
1998    28    17    .622        88    74    .543        60    57    .513        Johnson
1999    26    18    .591        84    78    .519        58    60    .492        Fregosi
2000    21    19    .525        83    79    .512        62    60    .508        Fregosi
2001    28    21    .571        80    82    .494        52    61    .460        Martinez
2002    23    21    .523        78    84    .481        55    63    .466        Martinez-Tosca
2003    14    23    .378        86    76    .531        72    53    .576        Tosca
2004    17    22    .436        67    94    .416        50    72    .410        Tosca-Gibbons
2005    16    31    .340        80    82    .494        64    51    .557        Gibbons
2006    20    10    .667        87    75    .537        67    65    .508        Gibbons
2007    29    25    .537        83    79    .512        54    54    .500        Gibbons
2008    24    32    .429        86    76    .531        62    44    .585        Gibbons-Gaston
2009    21    28    .429        75    87    .463        54    59    .478        Gaston
2010    24    28    .462        85    77    .525        61    49    .555        Gaston
2011    29    28    .509        81    81    .500        52    53    .495        Farrell
2012    15    25    .375        73    89    .451        58    64    .475        Farrell
2013    20    29    .408        74    88    .457        54    59    .478        Gibbons
2014    15    20    .429        83    79    .512        68    59    .535        Gibbons
2015    15    28    .349        93    69    .574        78    41    .655        Gibbons
2016    9    15    .375        51    40    .560        42    25    .627        Gibbons
                                                           
    874   926    .486      3129  3155   .498      2255  2229    .503              

So what was the most disturbing experience, when did the team lose way more one-run games than you would expect from a team of that general quality? That would be the 2015 team, who played .349 ball (15-28) in one-run games and .655 ball (78-41) the rest of the time. (Using my Coin Flip logic, they went roughly 15-6 on Quality, but the coin came up Tails 20 times in a row when they were calling Heads. Yikes.

The next worse? Meet this year's team, playing .375 ball (9-15) in one-run games, and .627 ball (42-25 the rest of the time.

Next worse? The 2005 squad, who played the one-run games at a .340 clip (16-31), while playing .557 ball.

What do these teams have in common? Well, there's ownership. And batting practice pitcher Jesus Figueroa. And... well, let's look at the managers, shall we?

This requires a bit of digging through the Game Logs, as the Jays made mid-season managerial changes in 1989, 1997, 2002, 2004, and 2008. And while Cito Gaston was the manager of the 1991 team that went 91-71, Gaston went into Mt Sinai Hospital with a herniated disk on August 21 of that year and was away from the ballpark for just over a month. Gene Tenace managed the games in his absence.

This time, instead of running through the data in chronological order, we'll rank the teams by their proficiency in one-run games. And by proficiency I don't mean mere winning percentage - I mean winning percentage in one-run games compared to winning percentage of the other games. Which Toronto team had the most good fortune in the close ones?

ONE-RUN OVERALL OTHER GAMES

Year    W   L    PCT        W    L   PCT        W      L     PCT      DIFF   Manager(s) 1997 2 0 1.000 4 1 .800 2 1 .667 .333 Queen 2006 20 10 .667 87 75 .537 67 65 .508 .159 Gibbons 1980 23 21 .523 67 95 .414 44 74 .373 .150 Mattick 1989 23 10 .697 77 49 .611 54 39 .581 .116 Gaston 2001 28 21 .571 80 82 .494 52 61 .460 .111 Martinez 1998 28 17 .622 88 74 .543 60 57 .513 .109 Johnson 1979 19 28 .404 53 109 .327 34 81 .296 .109 Hartsfield 1991 24 14 .632 72 57 .558 48 43 .527 .104 Gaston 1978 23 30 .434 59 102 .366 36 72 .333 .101 Hartsfield 1999 26 18 .591 84 78 .519 58 60 .492 .099 Fregosi 2002 5 6 .455 20 33 .377 15 27 .357 .097 Martinez 2004 13 14 .481 47 64 .423 34 50 .405 .077 Tosca 1977 17 27 .386 54 107 .335 37 80 .316 .070 Hartsfield 1984 34 25 .576 89 73 .549 55 48 .534 .042 Cox 2007 29 25 .537 83 79 .512 54 54 .500 .037 Gibbons 1995 16 23 .410 56 88 .389 40 65 .381 .029 Gaston 1981 10 17 .370 37 69 .349 27 52 .342 .029 Mattick 1997 27 30 .474 72 85 .459 45 55 .450 .024 Gaston 1988 21 17 .553 87 75 .537 66 58 .532 .020 Williams 2002 18 15 .545 58 51 .532 40 36 .526 .019 Tosca 2000 21 19 .525 83 79 .512 62 60 .508 .017 Fregosi 2011 29 28 .509 81 81 .500 52 53 .495 .014 Farrell 1996 19 22 .463 74 88 .457 55 66 .455 .009 Gaston 1983 25 20 .556 89 73 .549 64 53 .547 .009 Cox 1982 28 30 .483 78 84 .481 50 54 .481 .002 Cox 1992 28 20 .583 96 66 .593 68 46 .596 -.013 Gaston 1994 13 15 .464 55 60 .478 42 45 .483 -.018 Gaston 2009 21 28 .429 75 87 .463 54 59 .478 -.049 Gaston 2013 20 29 .408 74 88 .457 54 59 .478 -.070 Gibbons 1985 26 21 .553 99 62 .615 73 41 .640 -.087 Cox 2004 4 8 .333 20 30 .400 16 22 .421 -.088 Gibbons 1990 24 27 .471 86 76 .531 62 49 .559 -.088 Gaston 1986 22 25 .468 86 76 .531 64 51 .557 -.088 Williams 1987 27 24 .529 96 66 .593 69 42 .622 -.092 Williams 2010 24 28 .462 85 77 .525 61 49 .555 -.093 Gaston 2012 15 25 .375 73 89 .451 58 64 .475 -.100 Farrell 1993 23 22 .511 95 67 .586 72 45 .615 -.104 Gaston 2014 15 20 .429 83 79 .512 68 59 .535 -.107 Gibbons 2008 11 17 .393 35 39 .473 24 22 .522 -.129 Gibbons 2008 13 15 .464 51 37 .580 38 22 .633 -.169 Gaston 2003 14 23 .378 86 76 .531 72 53 .576 -.198 Tosca 2005 16 31 .340 80 82 .494 64 51 .557 -.216 Gibbons 2016 9 15 .375 51 40 .560 42 25 .627 -.252 Gibbons 1991 4 6 .400 19 14 .576 15 8 .652 -.252 Tenace 2015 15 28 .349 93 69 .574 78 41 .655 -.307 Gibbons 1989 2 12 .143 12 24 .333 10 12 .455 -.312 Williams
We're going to pass over Mel Queen's five game stint at the end of 1997, and try to remember the good fortune enjoyed by John Gibbons's 2006 team. They played .667 ball (20-10) in the one-run games, while being little more than a .500 team (67-65, .508) the rest of the time? Go figure. Cito Gaston's 1989 team was even better in the one-run games (23-10, .697) but that team was quite a bit better than the 2006 squad - they played .581 ball (54-39) for Gaston the rest of the time. And the most unfortunate manager of all was not Gibbons, although heaven knows his name does show up often enough as the bottom of this table. It was Jimy Williams in early 1989. The 12-24 start that cost him his job was built on a horrific 2-12 mark in the one-run games. Something I hadn't known!

And finally, let's just add up the manager's records and see how they've done in one-run games.
	                 ONE RUN GAMES	         OTHER GAMES		OVERALL				
Manager	                  W     L     PCT         W    L    PCT	        W     L	   PCT		DIFF
													
Hartsfield               59    85    .410       107   233   .315       166   318   .343	  .095
Mattick	                 33    38    .465        71   126   .360       104   164   .388	  .104
Cox	                113    96    .541       242   196   .553       355   292   .549	 -.012
Williams                 72    78    .480       209   163   .562       281   241   .538	 -.082
Gaston I (1989-2007)	197   183    .518       486   453   .518       683   636   .518	  .001
Tenace	                  4     6    .400        15     8   .652        19    14   .576	 -.252
Queen	                  2     0   1.000         2     1   .667         4     1   .800	  .333
Johnson	                 28    17    .622        60    57   .513        88    74   .543	  .109
Fregosi	                 47    37    .560       120   120   .500       167   157   .515	  .060
Martinez	         33    27    .550        67    88   .432       100   115   .465	  .118
Tosca	                 45    52    .464       146   139   .512       191   191   .500	 -.048
Gibbons I (2004-2008)	 80    91    .468       225   214   .513       305   305   .500	 -.045
Gaston II (2008-2010)	 58    71    .450       153   130   .541       211   201   .512	 -.091
Farrell	                 44    53    .454       110   117   .485       154   170   .475	 -.031
Gibbons II (2013-2016)	 59    92    .391       242   184   .568       301   276   .522	 -.177
													
Gaston TOTAL	        255   254    .501       639   583   .523       894   837   .516	 -.022
Gibbons TOTAL	        139   183    .432       467   398   .540       606   581   .511	 -.108
That final column just compares the manager's winning percentage in one-run games to his percentage in the other games.

In my view, all of these represent Small Samples. A few tidbits, nonetheless...

The terrible teams managed by Hartsfield and Mattick both posted significantly better results in one-run games, exactly as you would expect them to do. Mattick's teams helped themselves a little more than you might expect.

Bobby Cox's excellent teams didn't lose much to the coin flip at all...

Whereas Jimy Williams' teams were pretty bad in close games. His teams were even better than Cox's teams in the other games, but everything went to hell in one-run games.

Gaston's first tour is remarkable - the exact same winning percentage (.518)  in all kinds of games..

Jim Fregosi, Tim Johnson, and Buck Martinez all did quite well in one-run games, in their brief times in charge.

But since Martinez was fired, everything has gone to hell. All five managers (counting Gibbons twice) have seen significantly worse results in one-run games than you would expect. Tosca, Gibbons Mark I, and Farrell were all disappointing. Gaston Mark II was awful,  twice as bad as that Group of Three. And Gibbons Mark II - great gosh almighty, he's been twice as bad as that, some twenty-seven shades of godawful.

Something is clearly wrong with the coins around here. These last ten years or so have been weird. Really, really weird.

Anyway -  BlueJayWay.... we feel your pain.

Toronto and the One Run Fundamental | 40 comments | Create New Account
The following comments are owned by whomever posted them. This site is not responsible for what they say.
BlueJayWay - Tuesday, July 12 2016 @ 06:23 PM EDT (#326171) #
Thanks for the research. I'm almost scared to read through it all.
BlueJayWay - Tuesday, July 12 2016 @ 06:55 PM EDT (#326172) #
Okay I just came back and read it...

It's something to behold. It's like the Jays have inadvertantly stumbled into a way to build or manage a team to be bad in one run games, or they're on a run of historically bad luck.

I've been aware of this for quite a few years, and somehow it's more frustrating now that the team is good. I mean, look at those winning pctgs in all the 'other games' for 2015-16. This one run loss bugaboo is putting a serious dent into their potential record.

China fan - Tuesday, July 12 2016 @ 07:38 PM EDT (#326173) #
"...if you only flip it 30 or 40 times? Weird, weird things can happen...."

I have to say that I agree with this analysis:  it's the weirdness of random luck in small samples.   Unless we think Buck Martinez is a better manager than John Gibbons.  (And anyone who uses the one-run games as a data point to condemn Gibbons, as a few people here have sometimes done, must somehow explain the apparent superiority of Martinez, Tim Johnson etc.)
Mike Green - Tuesday, July 12 2016 @ 09:32 PM EDT (#326177) #
Gibbons' career line is even weirder than the data table suggests.  It works at both ends of the run differential scale.  In blowouts (5 runs plus), Gibbons' clubs are 201-126 (.615) and in games with margins 2-4 runs, his clubs are 266-272 (.494) and 404-455 in all non-blowout games (.470).  In other words, his clubs are over .600 in blowouts and well under .500 in all other games (in a sample of over 800 games). Normally you'd think that blowouts are the results least affected by luck and managerial decision.  If the rest were pure luck, you'd want to hide under a rock.  The chances of getting 47% or less heads in over 850 tosses where a coin is weighted to land on heads 61% of the time would be very, very small. 

I think that it isn't entirely luck (but that doesn't necessarily mean that Gibbons is a bad manager).  I don't think that the average Gibbons' team has been a true talent .615 club, or even close to that.  Gibbons has certain qualities which lead to more blowout wins.  He is more inclined than most managers to lock down a win which he perceives to be important- perhaps for good reason such as a key game against a divisional opponent.  This means more use of ace relievers with leads of 4 runs or more and more blowouts.  It also may mean that an ace reliever is not available the following day (depending on prior usage) in a close game.  The other thing is that he often makes unusual decisions in April with the pen as he feels his way into a season. I'll venture a guess that his record in one-run games in April is particularly horrid.  Again, there may be a positive side to it, much as these weird April decisions irritate me at the time.  The experimentation with Castro and Osuna last year had one failure and one success. 

I wouldn't suggest that evaluating a manager using this kind of analysis as the only tool or even the most important tool is a good idea.  Over the last two years, players of whom not much was expected have delivered for him (Goins and Pillar last year; Barney and Carrera this year).  I am not going to suggest that a manager deserves most of the credit for this, but in the same way that managerial decisions play a minor role in "optimization", they also play a role in development.  And on this score, the markers are positive. 
Mike Green - Tuesday, July 12 2016 @ 09:34 PM EDT (#326178) #
Also, thanks Magpie.  Data tables here, windy lore there!  Life is indeed a carnival.
Chuck - Tuesday, July 12 2016 @ 09:52 PM EDT (#326179) #
Windy, windy lore. We're all the better for it.
China fan - Wednesday, July 13 2016 @ 01:28 AM EDT (#326183) #
"...he often makes unusual decisions in April with the pen as he feels his way into a season..."

The Jays have certainly suffered from the poor performance of their bullpen in April this year and last year, but I don't think it's Gibby's fault.  He has been saddled with poor bullpens at the beginning of this year and last year.  He did his best with it, but many of the pitchers were bad.  In both cases, the GM failed to provide him with a strong enough bullpen.  Gibbons was saddled with relievers such as Storen and Castro who just weren't good enough.  Last year he was given Delabar and Loup and Hynes and other mediocrities, and there was nobody to replace them (until the trade deadline).  He has been burdened with poor starts from Cecil in both seasons.  I don't think it's the manager's fault -- he tried to squeeze something good out of those guys, but it just wasn't there.
Mike Green - Wednesday, July 13 2016 @ 09:06 AM EDT (#326188) #
Gibbons was saddled with relievers such as Storen and Castro who just weren't good enough

I don't want particularly to micro-analyze the past.  My point (made obliquely) was that the decision to thrust Castro into the ace reliever role in April was unusual- Castro had pitched in a starting role as high as A ball and not particularly successfully there.  Many managers would have been impressed by Castro's triple digit fastball in spring training, but would have either opted to have him sent out to the high minors to get some experience in the ace role or would have used him initially in a lower leverage role in the major leagues.  A similar thing happened with Arnold Leon in April this year, but Gibbons did not persist this time.  Like I said, it's not a huge deal
jerjapan - Wednesday, July 13 2016 @ 09:33 AM EDT (#326190) #
Castro and Osuna starting with the Jays last year was one of the most unique things AA did as GM, and clearly it worked - Osuna has been vital to this team and Castro's trade value was inflated by the promotion. 

Arnold Leon is not at all similar - he's a AAAA type, Osuna and Castro were projectable A ball guys.

 I don't see any strong candidates for the bullpen promotion this year but the pen could certainly use another weapon, 

Mike Green - Wednesday, July 13 2016 @ 09:51 AM EDT (#326192) #
Castro's trade value was inflated by the promotion

Really?  I can only guess what affects trade value, but I would be surprised if failing miserably at a role that was too much for Castro was a selling point.  Hoffman was, I was fairly sure, the key man for the Rockies in the Tulo deal. 
Dewey - Wednesday, July 13 2016 @ 09:59 AM EDT (#326193) #
Hoffman was, I was fairly sure, the key man for the Rockies in the Tulo deal.

Agreed, Mike.  One of the things that I felt never got much comment, however, was the degree to which AA was ‘hyping’ Hoffman in the weeks before the trade.  That wasn’t incidental surely.  He was a very shrewd trader, much of the time.  Not flawless (like us), but very shrewd nonetheless.
Mike Green - Wednesday, July 13 2016 @ 10:16 AM EDT (#326195) #
Oh yes, Dewey.  In hindsight, his 2014-15 off-season in particular has turned out remarkably well so far, with the Donaldson trade the jewel in the crown. 
Ishai - Wednesday, July 13 2016 @ 02:56 PM EDT (#326227) #
Fascinating read! It seems to me that the "no small ball" philosophy the Blue Jays subscribe to under Gibbons would have a non-zero effect on records in one run games. I am hypothesizing, but doesn't bunting a runner over/attempting a stolen base increase the chance of scoring exactly one run and decrease the chance of scoring more than one run? And if these are primarily being attempted in close games, especially when tied or behind, that could result in a greater percentage of wins being one run for a team that is more focused on situational hitting.
Ishai - Wednesday, July 13 2016 @ 03:06 PM EDT (#326229) #
Hypothesizing again, but it makes sense to me that situational hitting would flatten expected results against strength of pitching. The quality of late inning opposing pitching is highest in games when trailing or tied. The difference in difficulty of scoring one "manufactured" run against high quality pitching vs. low quality pitching is smaller than the difference in difficulty of scoring some number of runs by stringing together hits and walks against high quality pitching vs. low quality pitching.

This leads to an interesting follow up investigation. I wonder what factors correlate to the frequency of specific numbers of runs scored per inning. Do losing teams score a higher percentage of their runs in innings where only one run is scored? How about teams that have abnormally high or low records in one run games? How about teams that have demonstrated a commitment to situational hitting (not sure how you would measure that, maybe quantity of sacrifice hits + quantity of stolen base attempts)? I don't have the database or the knowhow to perform this investigation, but if someone does it I will certainly be interested in the results.
Dave Till - Wednesday, July 13 2016 @ 03:30 PM EDT (#326233) #
What an awesome set of data tables! Thank you!

The biggest reason why the Jays have been awful in one-run games in 2016 was Brett Cecil's horrible April:

- April 5, Jays lose 3-2, Cecil blows save and gets L
- April 12, Jays lose 3-2, Cecil gets L
- April 21, Jays lose 3-2, Cecil blows save and gets L
- April 30, Jays lose 4-3, Cecil gets L

Switch those four games around, and the Jays' one-run record goes from 9-15 to 13-11.
Mike Green - Wednesday, July 13 2016 @ 03:52 PM EDT (#326234) #
Cecil's bad April was one factor but...The April 5 game was the Bautista slide/double play upon review game.  In the April 12 game, Cecil gave up the game-winning run on Jacoby Ellsbury's "fly ball to deep SS-3B hole".  In the April 25 game, Cecil gave up the game-winning run on a ground ball single, a passed ball and Manny Machado's pop fly double down the right-field line.  Cecil's BABIP for the season is .383, and you can  see significant elements of bad luck in the one-run games the club lost with his contribution in April. 

I do think that the club should reduce the amount of shifting when Cecil is pitching.  It hasn't worked for him and in particular has led to more poorly hit balls falling in. 
Mike Green - Wednesday, July 13 2016 @ 03:53 PM EDT (#326235) #
Sorry, the Machado pop-fly double was in the April 21 game.
jerjapan - Wednesday, July 13 2016 @ 04:42 PM EDT (#326242) #
I can only guess what affects trade value, but I would be surprised if failing miserably at a role that was too much for Castro was a selling point.  Hoffman was, I was fairly sure, the key man for the Rockies in the Tulo deal.

Hoffman was unquestionably the primary component of the Tulo deal.  Castro was second.  One of the recurring critiques of our farm system is the lack of talent in the higher levels - proximity to the bigs is a legit component of trade value - Fangraphs has their trade value series up right now and the author made that point just yesterday.  The promotion of Castro increased his perceived proximity.   

Not saying that he was ready for the promotion, but Osuna certainly was.  Would Castro not be in high A ball right now if not for Stroman's injury? 
uglyone - Thursday, July 14 2016 @ 09:25 AM EDT (#326269) #
one of the great mysteries for me last year is why on earth did the jays have castro ahead of osuna in their minds to start the year? it never made sense to me. Osuna was always far ahead in my mind.
uglyone - Thursday, July 14 2016 @ 09:43 AM EDT (#326271) #
really that's a helluva article magpie. great stuff.

it does seem to be a legit criticism of gibbons but i don't hav3 the math chops to judge whether even that sample size is enough to draw a conclusion from.

I'm stuck thinking of anecdotal "evidence" from my memories.....of so many good relievers completely imploding for long stretches after being handed a high leverage role. of many "almost comebacks" wbere late rallies came up one run short.

I guess it would be interesting to diagnose the one run losses for any themes. what are the most common types? blown saves with good relievers on the mound? blown saves with crappy relievers on the mound? early deficits that the team can't come back from? late rallies that fall just short? all of the above?

I'm also stuck with the unreliable memory that last year our fortune in one run games seemed to turn on a dime as soon as the FO went all in at the trade deadline? did that actually happen? and if so, does it point to psychological "believe they can/should win" factors? and would a manager's ability to instill that kind of confidence/motivation then be a critical factor in these games?
uglyone - Thursday, July 14 2016 @ 09:48 AM EDT (#326272) #
"Really? I can only guess what affects trade value, but I would be surprised if failing miserably at a role that was too much for Castro was a selling point. Hoffman was, I was fairly sure, the key man for the Rockies in the Tulo deal. "

I gotta go with jer here - because the rockies use of castro this year seems to show that they most definitely traded for "Castro the fireballing MLB RP", not "Castro the A-ball SP prospect".

The jays use of him i'd say changed his value significantly. Enough that Castro was probably a bigger part of the deal than Tinoco, for example, even though not much seperates "Castro and Tinoco the low minors SP prospects".
uglyone - Thursday, July 14 2016 @ 09:53 AM EDT (#326273) #
" I don't see any strong candidates for the bullpen promotion this year but the pen could certainly use another weapon, "

Not saying that i'd recommend it but perhaps the best in house bullpen add would be SRF.
Mike Green - Thursday, July 14 2016 @ 10:22 AM EDT (#326275) #
it does seem to be a legit criticism of gibbons but i don't hav3 the math chops to judge whether even that sample size is enough to draw a conclusion from.

It's a binomial distribution problem.  So let's say that Gibbons' clubs would ordinarily have been expected to win 54% of their one-run games.  You could then use a calculator like this one to calculate the probability that they would win fewer than 139 or fewer out of 322 games.  The probability is 1 in 10,000.  If Gibbons' clubs would ordinarily have been expected to win 53% of their one-run games, the probability of winning 139 or fewer is 7 out of 10,000.   If the expected figure is 52% of their one-run games, the figure is 26 out of 10,000. 
Mike Green - Thursday, July 14 2016 @ 10:31 AM EDT (#326276) #
I'd be inclined to the 52% figure, by the way, notwithstanding the .615 record in blowouts.    I think that Gibbons' clubs have had a true talent level of about .540 and won somewhat more blowouts than expected for a team of this true talent.  True talent teams of .540 ought to win about 52% of one-run games, as suggested by Magpie's table. 

26 out of 10,000 might be very, very bad luck, but I don't think it is. 
Mike Green - Thursday, July 14 2016 @ 11:27 AM EDT (#326282) #
Crap.  I read the columns wrong in the calculator.  The probabilities of winning 139 or fewer of 322 games were 1 in 10,000 at 54% true talent, 3 in 10,000 at 53%  ,and 9 in 10,000 at 52%.  To complete the picture, it's 29 in 10,000 at 51% and 82 in 10,000 at 50%.   There is no reason at all to believe that Gibbons' clubs ought to have a winning percentage as low as .500 in one-run games. 
SK in NJ - Thursday, July 14 2016 @ 02:35 PM EDT (#326287) #
According to this article, Gibbons was one of the worst bullpen managers in the game last season, only behind Matheny. I'm not surprised by that since I'm often perplexed with his bullpen decisions (or when he takes SP's out of games). I actually think he was much worse last season than he has been this season in that regard. You can agree or disagree with the analysis, it's just food for thought.

http://grantland.com/the-triangle/2015-mlb-playoffs-bullpen-managers-mike-matheny-joe-girardi/
Mike Green - Thursday, July 14 2016 @ 03:09 PM EDT (#326289) #
The article indicates that there isn't much year-to-year correlation. 

The 3 year statistics for Gibbons aren't great, but a lot better than the 2015 ones alone.  The point about the 8 years of data in one-run games, two-to-four run games and blowouts is that it gives you quite a large sample. 

SK in NJ - Thursday, July 14 2016 @ 03:20 PM EDT (#326291) #
I thought Gibbons was awful more often than not in 2015 with the bullpen. I don't get that same feeling in 2016. He still makes some head scratching moves like all managers do, but 2015 was on another level.
Mike Green - Thursday, July 14 2016 @ 06:21 PM EDT (#326302) #
I checked the April record for Gibbons in one-run games.  It's pretty horrific- 17-36 (9-18 the first go round and 8-18 the second).  If the one-run games were a pure coin toss, the probability of winning 17 or less is 6 in 1,000. 
92-93 - Thursday, July 14 2016 @ 07:43 PM EDT (#326309) #
Osuna wasn't just behind Castro on the depth chart, uglyone; I remember hearing/reading suggestions that Osuna was making the majors as Castro's translator, a buddy to help ease the transition.
China fan - Thursday, July 14 2016 @ 08:42 PM EDT (#326315) #
"....If the one-run games were a pure coin toss, the probability of winning 17 or less is 6 in 1,000...."

But in a small sample size, it's obviously not a pure coin toss. As Magpie noted above, you'd have to flip a coin thousands of times before you eliminate all of the variance due to random luck.  Gibbons hasn't managed thousands of one-run games, so weird things can still happen as a result of random chance.

You seem to be arguing that random coin-flip luck is unlikely to be the explanation.  But in small samples, lots of unlikely things happen.  You can't prove anything by saying that a specific outcome is unlikely.  Improbable things often happen.  They don't prove anything about a manager's calibre.

There are thousands of factors at play in the one-run games, and any attempt to reduce it to the manager as the main explanatory factor is reckless.  As Magpie said in his main post above:  "In my view, all of these represent Small Samples."

Mike Green - Thursday, July 14 2016 @ 09:32 PM EDT (#326319) #
That's the point, CF.  It is actually not a small sample from a probabilistic perspective.  Can a true talent .500 club start out the season 11-0 by pure luck?  Sure.  That's about the kind of probabilities we're talking about here, but most people would infer from an 11-0 start that the club was very likely better than a true talent .500 club. 

At what point would you consider that the sample was large enough?  When the probability of it occuring randomly was 1 in a million? 1 in 100,000?


China fan - Thursday, July 14 2016 @ 09:48 PM EDT (#326321) #
Mike, you're asking hypothetical questions, and I'd prefer to stick to the actual data.  The actual data is not a big enough sample size -- and there are hundreds of factors at play, not simply the manager's decisions.  Those are the main problems with any attempt to use this data as evidence against Gibbons.

But if we are using hypothetical questions, I would respond with a question of my own:  do you consider Buck Martinez to be a better manager than Gibbons because he has a better record in one-run games?

Mike Green - Thursday, July 14 2016 @ 10:04 PM EDT (#326322) #
Please read up-thread, CF.  I said that one ought not to use record in one-run games as the major factor in evaluating a manager.  It is also wrong to suggest that managers make no impact on the result in one-run games.  Managerial decisions are not the most important factor- luck and team quality are the two most important factors- but it does matter what the manager does.  And after 8 seasons, you may (or may not) have significant evidence about a manager's contribution be it good or bad.  In Gibbons' case, there is such evidence. 

I also pointed out upthread that Gibbons ought to given a share of the credit for the unexpected development of players such as Carrera, Barney, Goins and Pillar. 

China fan - Thursday, July 14 2016 @ 11:29 PM EDT (#326328) #
"....In Gibbons' case, there is such evidence...."

Mike, I guess we're just going to have to agree to disagree on this.  I don't consider this data to be legitimate evidence about managerial ability.
Dave Till - Friday, July 15 2016 @ 08:48 AM EDT (#326340) #
I am willing to believe that Gibbons isn't good at managing a bullpen, though I'm not sure how you manage some of the bullpens he has been given to work with at the start of the season.

But I am wondering: what is he doing wrong? Has anyone any info on what good bullpen managers are doing right, and what bad bullpen managers need to improve on?
Mike Green - Friday, July 15 2016 @ 09:48 AM EDT (#326341) #
"Locking down" the win with a big lead using high leverage relievers has effects down the road.  It may ultimately be all right for the club, but may also lead to fewer one-run wins. 

The big item is just getting the ball to the right pitcher at the right time.  Here's the WPA chart for Toronto's relievers in 2015. The problem areas were Castro and Loup.  In 2014, it was Sergio Santos.

This year, the questionable decision-making is much more at the margins and mostly the issues have arisen from "locking down".  For example, it has been pretty clear from the first week that Osuna was far and away the best reliever in the pen.  You've got to really leverage his work if you want to maximize his value.  He's been very good, but his work has not been optimally leveraged.  So, for instance, on May 25, the Jays led the Yankees 8-3 going to the ninth.  Gibbons brought in Girodo to face Ackley, Headley and Gregorius. Romine pinch-hit for Ackley and homered.  Headley grounded out and Gregorius singled on the ground.  On came Osuna to face Hicks and Ellsbury.  The Jays won the game.  They were in tight games the next two days and Osuna pitched.  All of this contributed to the need to shut him down for a week in June. 

In the game on May 25, Gibbons had a shortage of "trusted" options.  Chavez had been pitching well through May 16.  He did not have an outing between May 16 and May 24. On May 24, he was brought in with the Jays trailing 4-0 in the 8th and gave up a single and two walks and got a ground ball for the force out at the plate before being pulled.  Chavez had been suspended for 3 games during the May 16-24 period arising out of the Texas incident, but Gibbons didn't make sure to give him work around the suspension. Personally, I wouldn't have treated the May 24 outing as an occasion to lose trust in the circumstances.

It's awfully nit-picky stuff and I am not suggesting that it is hugely important in the grand scheme of things.  I just don't think that the 8 year record in one-run games is purely a matter of bad luck.  


Dave Till - Friday, July 15 2016 @ 10:19 AM EDT (#326347) #

For example, it has been pretty clear from the first week that Osuna was far and away the best reliever in the pen. You've got to really leverage his work if you want to maximize his value. He's been very good, but his work has not been optimally leveraged.

Thanks for your detailed response! But this leads me to wonder whether the problem wasn't that Osuna hasn't been optimally leveraged, but that he was literally the only relief pitcher that the Jays had who could be counted on to not immediately blow the lead. Many times, the alternatives appeared to be Osuna or a loss. I can't see how using Storen, Cecil, or Floyd more often would have improved the Jays' record in one-run games.

Also, the offense is partly to blame. Fun fact: the Jays scored 10 or more runs exactly once in the first 50 games of the season. Since then, the Jays have scored 10 or more runs nine times. The best way to manage the bullpen in high-leverage situations is to eliminate these situations!

Mike Green - Friday, July 15 2016 @ 10:30 AM EDT (#326348) #
As I said, it is really marginal stuff in 2016- using Leon once in a poor choice of situations, not using Osuna and Chavez ideally.  Lots of managers do this kind of thing and worse.  The really good news is that I expect the club to do well in this department in the second half of 2016 (as they did in 2015).  Cecil looks good to me, and has had a pattern of being much better in the second half of the year.  Grilli was a good addition.  Schultz looks very good.  Gibbons himself seems to be much more relaxed than he was earlier in the year- it must be frustrating knowing in your heart that you have a really great club which simply isn't winning at the rate it should. 
grjas - Friday, July 15 2016 @ 07:42 PM EDT (#326377) #
From 2012 to 2016 the Jays had between the third and fifth worst save percentage in the league every year save one. And yeah I know the limitations on the save measure, but it is still a useful indicator of the quality of the back end of a bullpen. I suspect this is at least one factor affecting the last five years' stats.
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