It wasn't the best of times, it wasn't the worst times. It was just like all the other times.
It was pretty irritating, to tell you the truth.
It was Tuesday 28 July. On Sunday, the Jays had lost in extra innings when Franklin Gutierrez hit a walk-off home run against Aaron Loup. It was the team's 100th game, and they'd won exactly half of them. As you might recall, I detected a certain pattern:
But it was that very afternoon when Alex Anthopoulos, who had so notoriously done nothing whatsoever at the trading deadline the year before, began to shake up his ball club. For this was the First Day of the Great Mid-Season Overhaul, the likes of which had never before been seen in the reasonably long annals of Blue Jays Lore.
On the First Day, Anthopoulos obtained Troy Tulowitzi and LaTroy Hawkins from Colorado in exchange for Jose Reyes and pitching "prospects." (TINSTAAPP.) Savvy vet that he is, Hawkins had his passport on hand as the trading deadline approached, and was able to join his new team that very evening as they opened a series with the hapless Phillies. I grumbled that while Tulowitzki certainly represented a defensive upgrade at shortstop, he didn't really do much to address what I regarded as the team's real problem. That problem I described - somewhat pithily, if I do say so myself - as "pitching, pitching, pitching" and I would further submit that that very problem was made manifest for all to see by the identity of Toronto's starting pitcher that night. It was none other than the redoubtable Felix Doubront of high reknown. Doubront, makng his fourth start for the Jays, was the third man trying to fill the rotation spot originally held down by Aaron Sanchez, Scott Copeland and Matt Boyd having already been weighed in the balance and found wanting.
The evening's ball game started off well enough. Devon Travis led off with a home run. Travis had been absolutely en fuego (.354/.400/.451) since returning to the lineup after missing six weeks with a shoulder injury. Nevertheless, he had yet to hit a home run since his return, after hitting 7 in his first 36 games before getting hurt. That works out to roughly a 30 HR pace, and something pretty nice to have from your second baseman. So that's good news to start the game. But alas - this home run would also be the last one Travis would hit in 2015. He tweaked his shoulder again while striking out in the second inning. Had we known that he wouldn't play again all season - and he wouldn't - we would have been sad. Very sad indeed.
Staked to a 2-0 lead, Doubront cruised into the fifth inning. And then it all fell apart. Ryan Howard fouled a ball off his own body. It rolled into fair territory, and Howard alertly lit out for first base. With the Jays playing a shift, he made it easily - and the umpires allowed it to stand, howls of protest from Gibbons and the Blue Jays notwithstanding. Doubront promptly fell apart, allowing three consecutive doubles and a wild pitch. The Phillies scored three times, and that was the ball game. Toronto fell to 50-51.
But on the Second Day, Anthopoulos liberated David Price from the Tigers in exchange for another gaggle of pitching "prospects" (TINSTAAPP).
And from that day forward... everything was different.
How different? Why different? Let us examine the entrails...
As we all realized at the time, the Jays' 50-51 record was bizarre. The team had scored 530 runs (5.24 per game) while allowing 436 (4.32 per game.) A team that does that over 101 games can be expected to go 60-41 rather than 50-51. When a team falls that far short of its Pythagorean expectation, you will always - always - find one of two factors present: 1) a tendency to lose a lot of close games or 2) a tendency to beat the other fellows senseless on a regular basis. The Jays were coming through in both ways. At this point, the Jays were a miserable 10-22 in one-run games, while posting a sensational 21-7 record in games decided by 5 runs or more.
As is very well known (I've said so a gazillion times, haven't I?) - a team's record in one-run games only tells us something about a team's luck. Whereas a team's record in blowouts tells us something about that team's quality. Their frustrating, inexplicable won-loss record notwithstanding, the 2015 Blue Jays were already a very good team. They were just a team that had been utterly cursed by fortune.
But from this day forward, they would be a) even better, and b) not unlucky. In the final 61 games they would go 43-18, and a team that scores 361 runs and allows 234 in 61 games can expect to post a record... pretty much just like that. Over those final 61 games, the team's runs scored increased from 5.24 per game to 5.92; their runs allowed were reduced from 4.32 per game to 3.84. They were better on both sides of the ball, and by roughly the same amount. And - perhaps just as important - their luck evened out. They didn't play nearly as many close games, and they went 5-6 in the ones they did play. Which is good enough, especially as they continued to play very well (16-6) in the blowouts.
So what, precisely, was better over those final two months? (That's the question I'm here to address - the preceding is just a Big and Fancy Prologue.) David Price represented a truly massive upgrade over the likes of Felix Doubront. However, Mark Buehrle, who had been the team's best and most dependable starter over the first part of the season faded pretty badly over the final two months. Something similar had happened to Buehrle in 2014, and it's something that happens to a lot of pitchers as they age - they can still be as effective as ever, but they can't maintain it for 30 plus starts. If it was 1950, Buehrle could transition nicely into being a Sunday pitcher. Unfortunately, the day when teams played a double-header every Sunday - and hence the need for a Sunday pitcher - has been gone for a long time.
As for the offence, somewhat surprisingly. Troy Tulowitzki really didn't provide any thing with the bat that was better than what Jose Reyes was already giving the team. As already mentioned, Devon Travis missed all of the remaining games, a development which turned notorious non-hitter Ryan Goins into an everyday player. Goins did hit much better than expected, but he didn't hit as well as Travis. So how to account for the massive offensive improvement that followed. What exactly happened? Ben Revere? I don't think so.
It's Data Table time! What we have here are Before and After stat packs: what the players did over the first 101 games, and what they did over the final 61. I've got the raw numbers, but I think you can see more clearly what happened if we pro-rate both sets of numbers to a 162 game schedule.
So here are the hitters through July 28, pro-rated to a full season.
That is one hell of an offense. It was the best offense in baseball already. But, as we know, it got better. Much, much better. Here's how:
See what happened? It turns out to be pretty simple. Donaldson, Bautista, and Encarnacion were really good in the first part of the season. But over the final two months, they were insanely great. Ridiculously great. Unfathomably awesome. That's really the whole story. Tulowitzki replacing Reyes was a wash. Pillar and, especially, Goins hit better over the final two months, which was good news - but it was good news that was negated by the complete absence of Travis and Russell Martin's struggles with the bat over the final two months. It just didn't matter. This was all about Donaldson, Bautista, and Encarnacion. Three horseman so powerful they brought on the apocalypse by themselves.
I'm not going to pro-rate the pitching numbers - that gets silly. What happened there is also pretty easy to see. Here's the first 101 games:
Not too good. Buehrle was an absolute rock, Hutchison was really lucky, and Estrada (6-6, 3.87 as a starter) was coming on. But Dickey was scuffling, the fifth starter was a revolving door, and the bullpen was one long tryout camp.
And over the final 61:
Once again it's almost entirely about three players: David Price, Marco Estrada, and R.A. Dickey. While Mark Buehrle faded over the final six weeks, Dickey and Estrada pitched significantly better in August and September than they had during the first part of the season. Price, of course, was simply a Massive Improvement over the ne'er-do-wells who'd been filling out the rotation. The baffling, frustrating campaign of Drew Hutchison continued on until he was supplanted by the surprising return of Marcus Stroman, who did his very best David Price imitation over the final three weeks. The bullpen was not dramatically better - Roberto Osuna and Liam Hendriks did not pitch as well over the final two months as they had earlier in the year. But the additions of veterans Lowe and Hawkins and the return of Sanchez to the pen - none of whom were great, but all of whom were serviceable - did make the relief corps much deeper, much more reliable, and much more sensible. This meant that the manager was able to define roles for his relievers. Relief pitchers are generally more effective when they understand how they're going to be used, but it was very difficult for Gibbons to sort out the roles in his pen while the tryouts were still going on. In addition, the improved performance of the starters reduced what was required from the relievers.
And Brett Cecil, over the final two months... well, I don't know what to say. Seriously, just look at those numbers. American League batters hit .123/ .135/ .151 against someone? Really? The guy struck out 31 and walked 1? That actually happened?
That's got to be about as well as any reliever has ever pitched. Hard to be better, at any rate.
It was pretty irritating, to tell you the truth.
It was Tuesday 28 July. On Sunday, the Jays had lost in extra innings when Franklin Gutierrez hit a walk-off home run against Aaron Loup. It was the team's 100th game, and they'd won exactly half of them. As you might recall, I detected a certain pattern:
After 100 games:
2015 50-50
2014 51-49
2013 45-55
2012 51-49
2011 50-50
2010 51-49
2009 49-51
2008 49-51
2007 50-50
Gotta admire the consistency.
But it was that very afternoon when Alex Anthopoulos, who had so notoriously done nothing whatsoever at the trading deadline the year before, began to shake up his ball club. For this was the First Day of the Great Mid-Season Overhaul, the likes of which had never before been seen in the reasonably long annals of Blue Jays Lore.
On the First Day, Anthopoulos obtained Troy Tulowitzi and LaTroy Hawkins from Colorado in exchange for Jose Reyes and pitching "prospects." (TINSTAAPP.) Savvy vet that he is, Hawkins had his passport on hand as the trading deadline approached, and was able to join his new team that very evening as they opened a series with the hapless Phillies. I grumbled that while Tulowitzki certainly represented a defensive upgrade at shortstop, he didn't really do much to address what I regarded as the team's real problem. That problem I described - somewhat pithily, if I do say so myself - as "pitching, pitching, pitching" and I would further submit that that very problem was made manifest for all to see by the identity of Toronto's starting pitcher that night. It was none other than the redoubtable Felix Doubront of high reknown. Doubront, makng his fourth start for the Jays, was the third man trying to fill the rotation spot originally held down by Aaron Sanchez, Scott Copeland and Matt Boyd having already been weighed in the balance and found wanting.
The evening's ball game started off well enough. Devon Travis led off with a home run. Travis had been absolutely en fuego (.354/.400/.451) since returning to the lineup after missing six weeks with a shoulder injury. Nevertheless, he had yet to hit a home run since his return, after hitting 7 in his first 36 games before getting hurt. That works out to roughly a 30 HR pace, and something pretty nice to have from your second baseman. So that's good news to start the game. But alas - this home run would also be the last one Travis would hit in 2015. He tweaked his shoulder again while striking out in the second inning. Had we known that he wouldn't play again all season - and he wouldn't - we would have been sad. Very sad indeed.
Staked to a 2-0 lead, Doubront cruised into the fifth inning. And then it all fell apart. Ryan Howard fouled a ball off his own body. It rolled into fair territory, and Howard alertly lit out for first base. With the Jays playing a shift, he made it easily - and the umpires allowed it to stand, howls of protest from Gibbons and the Blue Jays notwithstanding. Doubront promptly fell apart, allowing three consecutive doubles and a wild pitch. The Phillies scored three times, and that was the ball game. Toronto fell to 50-51.
But on the Second Day, Anthopoulos liberated David Price from the Tigers in exchange for another gaggle of pitching "prospects" (TINSTAAPP).
And from that day forward... everything was different.
How different? Why different? Let us examine the entrails...
As we all realized at the time, the Jays' 50-51 record was bizarre. The team had scored 530 runs (5.24 per game) while allowing 436 (4.32 per game.) A team that does that over 101 games can be expected to go 60-41 rather than 50-51. When a team falls that far short of its Pythagorean expectation, you will always - always - find one of two factors present: 1) a tendency to lose a lot of close games or 2) a tendency to beat the other fellows senseless on a regular basis. The Jays were coming through in both ways. At this point, the Jays were a miserable 10-22 in one-run games, while posting a sensational 21-7 record in games decided by 5 runs or more.
As is very well known (I've said so a gazillion times, haven't I?) - a team's record in one-run games only tells us something about a team's luck. Whereas a team's record in blowouts tells us something about that team's quality. Their frustrating, inexplicable won-loss record notwithstanding, the 2015 Blue Jays were already a very good team. They were just a team that had been utterly cursed by fortune.
But from this day forward, they would be a) even better, and b) not unlucky. In the final 61 games they would go 43-18, and a team that scores 361 runs and allows 234 in 61 games can expect to post a record... pretty much just like that. Over those final 61 games, the team's runs scored increased from 5.24 per game to 5.92; their runs allowed were reduced from 4.32 per game to 3.84. They were better on both sides of the ball, and by roughly the same amount. And - perhaps just as important - their luck evened out. They didn't play nearly as many close games, and they went 5-6 in the ones they did play. Which is good enough, especially as they continued to play very well (16-6) in the blowouts.
So what, precisely, was better over those final two months? (That's the question I'm here to address - the preceding is just a Big and Fancy Prologue.) David Price represented a truly massive upgrade over the likes of Felix Doubront. However, Mark Buehrle, who had been the team's best and most dependable starter over the first part of the season faded pretty badly over the final two months. Something similar had happened to Buehrle in 2014, and it's something that happens to a lot of pitchers as they age - they can still be as effective as ever, but they can't maintain it for 30 plus starts. If it was 1950, Buehrle could transition nicely into being a Sunday pitcher. Unfortunately, the day when teams played a double-header every Sunday - and hence the need for a Sunday pitcher - has been gone for a long time.
As for the offence, somewhat surprisingly. Troy Tulowitzki really didn't provide any thing with the bat that was better than what Jose Reyes was already giving the team. As already mentioned, Devon Travis missed all of the remaining games, a development which turned notorious non-hitter Ryan Goins into an everyday player. Goins did hit much better than expected, but he didn't hit as well as Travis. So how to account for the massive offensive improvement that followed. What exactly happened? Ben Revere? I don't think so.
It's Data Table time! What we have here are Before and After stat packs: what the players did over the first 101 games, and what they did over the final 61. I've got the raw numbers, but I think you can see more clearly what happened if we pro-rate both sets of numbers to a 162 game schedule.
So here are the hitters through July 28, pro-rated to a full season.
Player G PA AB R H 2B 3B HR RBI BB IBB SO HBP SH SF GDP SB CS BAVG OBP SLG OPS RC/27
Donaldson 159 703 627 112 180 40 0 38 109 59 0 136 6 2 8 18 5 0 .286 .350 .535 .885 6.8
Bautista 151 648 521 99 120 29 3 34 106 111 3 99 6 0 10 18 6 3 .231 .366 .492 .859 6.2
Encarnacion 152 642 547 80 130 26 0 30 90 79 2 111 6 0 10 18 2 3 .238 .335 .452 .787 5.1
Martin 138 545 476 90 125 29 3 22 75 53 0 109 10 0 6 18 6 6 .263 .344 .478 .822 5.6
Pillar 160 632 593 80 160 32 3 11 59 29 0 93 3 3 3 8 24 5 .270 .306 .392 .698 4.2
Travis 99 383 350 61 106 29 0 13 56 29 0 69 3 0 2 6 5 2 .303 .360 .495 .855 6.9
Colabello 101 393 364 63 114 21 0 14 61 26 0 98 2 0 2 14 3 0 .313 .359 .489 .848 6.5
Reyes 111 499 462 58 132 27 0 6 55 27 0 61 0 6 3 5 26 3 .285 .322 .385 .708 4.4
Valencia 90 266 250 42 74 21 0 11 47 13 0 59 0 2 2 6 3 2 .295 .327 .513 .840 5.8
Smoak 124 274 245 38 58 11 2 14 45 29 0 77 0 0 0 11 0 0 .235 .316 .471 .786 4.9
Carrera 107 247 221 34 56 8 0 5 34 14 0 56 3 6 2 2 3 2 .254 .307 .355 .662 3.7
Goins 114 348 313 32 69 13 3 3 40 19 0 61 2 10 5 10 0 2 .221 .265 .313 .578 2.4
Navarro 53 183 162 18 35 6 0 3 18 14 2 27 0 0 6 0 0 0 .218 .272 .317 .589 3.1
Pompey 37 146 133 16 26 10 0 3 10 10 0 35 3 0 0 0 3 0 .193 .264 .337 .601 3.2
Tolleson 30 72 66 14 18 8 2 0 5 6 0 14 0 0 0 2 3 0 .268 .333 .439 .772 5.3
Thole 14 47 42 6 11 3 0 0 3 5 0 3 0 0 0 2 0 0 .269 .345 .346 .691 4.3
Saunders 14 58 50 3 10 0 0 0 5 8 0 16 0 0 0 2 0 0 .194 .306 .194 .499 2.4
Kawasaki 19 27 24 3 5 3 0 0 2 3 0 3 0 0 0 2 0 2 .200 .294 .333 .627 2.0
Diaz 6 11 8 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 0 2 0 2 0 0 0 0 .000 .167 .000 .167 0.4
That is one hell of an offense. It was the best offense in baseball already. But, as we know, it got better. Much, much better. Here's how:
Player G PA AB R H 2B 3B HR RBI BB IBB SO HBP SH SF GDP SB CS BAVG OBP SLG OPS RC/27
Encarnacion 135 595 497 117 173 40 0 53 146 74 11 77 13 0 11 8 5 0 .348 .438 .749 1.186 13.7
Donaldson 157 725 608 138 191 42 5 45 146 96 0 127 5 3 13 13 8 0 .314 .404 .624 1.029 9.9
Bautista 157 696 579 122 162 29 3 50 127 109 0 117 3 0 5 21 11 0 .280 .393 .601 .994 8.9
Revere 149 653 600 93 191 24 3 3 50 35 0 74 3 8 8 3 19 5 .319 .354 .381 .734 5.1
Pillar 157 621 574 69 167 29 0 13 50 27 3 72 8 5 8 11 27 3 .292 .328 .412 .740 4.8
Goins 151 560 481 85 135 21 5 8 53 72 0 120 0 3 5 16 5 0 .282 .371 .398 .769 5.6
Colabello 101 305 282 42 96 16 3 16 42 16 0 93 5 0 3 8 0 0 .340 .383 .585 .968 8.7
Tulowitzki 109 486 433 82 104 21 0 13 45 37 3 112 13 0 3 11 3 0 .239 .317 .380 .697 4.3
Smoak 146 417 380 53 82 24 0 24 82 29 0 101 5 0 3 8 0 0 .217 .280 .469 .749 4.4
Martin 114 444 382 53 74 13 0 24 80 53 3 101 5 0 3 29 0 3 .194 .299 .417 .716 3.5
Navarro 56 207 186 16 53 8 0 8 24 21 0 32 0 0 0 0 0 0 .286 .359 .457 .816 6.6
Pennington 88 244 199 24 32 8 0 5 29 29 0 53 3 8 5 5 0 0 .160 .270 .280 .550 2.3
Carrera 61 90 82 13 27 8 0 0 13 5 0 27 0 0 3 0 0 0 .323 .353 .419 .772 5.9
Barney 40 69 61 11 19 3 0 5 11 3 0 5 0 5 0 0 0 0 .304 .333 .609 .942 7.0
Pompey 29 32 29 19 13 5 0 0 0 3 0 3 0 0 0 3 8 3 .455 .500 .636 1.136 9.5
Hague 27 40 32 3 8 3 0 0 0 5 3 11 3 0 0 0 0 0 .250 .400 .333 .733 5.4
Kawasaki 29 45 35 11 8 0 0 0 3 5 0 11 0 5 0 0 0 0 .231 .333 .231 .564 2.4
Valencia 5 19 16 0 5 0 0 0 0 3 0 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 .333 .429 .333 .762 6.5
Diaz 8 24 21 3 5 0 0 0 3 0 0 5 3 0 0 0 0 0 .250 .333 .250 .583 3.4
Thole 24 61 61 3 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 19 0 0 0 3 0 0 .130 .130 .130 .261 0.4
See what happened? It turns out to be pretty simple. Donaldson, Bautista, and Encarnacion were really good in the first part of the season. But over the final two months, they were insanely great. Ridiculously great. Unfathomably awesome. That's really the whole story. Tulowitzki replacing Reyes was a wash. Pillar and, especially, Goins hit better over the final two months, which was good news - but it was good news that was negated by the complete absence of Travis and Russell Martin's struggles with the bat over the final two months. It just didn't matter. This was all about Donaldson, Bautista, and Encarnacion. Three horseman so powerful they brought on the apocalypse by themselves.
I'm not going to pro-rate the pitching numbers - that gets silly. What happened there is also pretty easy to see. Here's the first 101 games:
Player W L ERA G GS SV HLD BSV IP H R ER BB SO HR HBP BF BAVG OBP SLG OPS BAbip
Buehrle 11 5 3.29 20 20 0 0 0 134.0 139 54 49 21 67 13 2 548 .270 .298 .419 .718 .286
Dickey 4 10 4.53 20 20 0 0 0 129.0 121 67 65 46 80 17 9 548 .249 .322 .427 .749 .264
Hutchison 9 2 5.42 20 20 0 0 0 108.0 128 70 65 34 98 13 8 481 .296 .353 .448 .801 .351
Estrada 7 6 3.55 21 15 0 0 0 99.0 85 43 39 32 78 11 2 411 .227 .290 .381 .672 .258
Sanchez 6 4 3.44 13 11 0 0 0 68.0 59 28 26 37 44 8 2 288 .239 .341 .385 .726 .260
Osuna 1 4 2.23 42 0 5 7 1 44.1 31 12 11 11 51 2 1 174 .195 .249 .308 .557 .269
Hendriks 2 0 2.64 34 0 0 5 2 44.1 35 15 13 6 45 2 1 173 .212 .243 .285 .528 .277
Loup 2 5 5.19 45 0 0 8 4 34.2 36 22 20 6 38 6 4 149 .261 .311 .457 .767 .319
Cecil 2 4 4.05 37 0 5 3 2 33.1 30 15 15 12 39 4 2 140 .240 .317 .400 .717 .317
Schultz 0 1 2.33 18 0 1 3 2 27.0 17 9 7 7 23 4 1 104 .179 .240 .316 .556 .188
Delabar 2 0 3.33 27 0 1 4 3 27.0 19 12 10 12 29 3 1 111 .198 .291 .354 .645 .246
Tepera 0 1 2.28 21 0 0 0 0 23.2 15 6 6 4 16 4 2 88 .183 .239 .366 .604 .177
Norris 1 1 3.86 5 5 0 0 0 23.1 23 11 10 12 18 3 2 103 .267 .363 .453 .816 .299
Doubront 1 1 4.76 5 4 0 0 0 22.2 32 15 12 5 13 1 1 101 .340 .376 .447 .823 .383
Redmond 0 0 7.31 7 1 0 1 0 16.0 17 13 13 7 13 3 1 72 .266 .347 .500 .847 .292
Copeland 1 1 6.46 5 3 0 0 0 15.1 24 11 11 2 6 1 0 69 .369 .382 .523 .905 .390
Castro 0 2 4.38 13 0 4 1 2 12.1 15 7 6 6 12 2 0 57 .306 .368 .490 .858 .351
Francis 1 2 6.75 8 0 0 0 0 12.0 16 10 9 5 15 1 1 57 .314 .386 .451 .837 .429
Boyd 0 2 14.85 2 2 0 0 0 6.2 15 11 11 1 7 5 0 36 .441 .444 .882 1.327 .435
Hynes 0 0 6.00 5 0 0 0 0 3.0 8 2 2 2 4 0 0 18 .500 .556 .563 1.118 .667
Albers 0 0 3.38 1 0 0 0 0 2.2 1 1 1 2 1 1 0 11 .111 .273 .444 .717 .000
Coke 0 0 3.38 2 0 0 1 0 2.2 1 1 1 2 3 1 0 11 .111 .273 .444 .717 .000
Jenkins 0 0 4.50 1 0 0 0 0 2.0 1 1 1 1 2 0 0 9 .250 .333 .250 .583 .333
Rasmussen 0 0 0.00 1 0 0 0 0 1.0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 4 .250 .250 .250 .500 .333
Hawkins 0 0 0.00 1 0 0 0 0 1.0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 3 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
Not too good. Buehrle was an absolute rock, Hutchison was really lucky, and Estrada (6-6, 3.87 as a starter) was coming on. But Dickey was scuffling, the fifth starter was a revolving door, and the bullpen was one long tryout camp.
And over the final 61:
Player W L ERA G GS SV HLD BSV IP H R ER BB SO HR HBP BF BAVG OBP SLG OPS BAbip
Dickey 7 1 2.95 13 13 0 0 0 85.1 74 30 28 15 46 8 2 336 .236 .272 .371 .642 .250
Estrada 6 2 2.63 13 13 0 0 0 82.0 49 24 24 23 53 13 3 314 .173 .240 .342 .582 .164
Price 9 1 2.30 11 11 0 0 0 74.1 57 20 19 18 87 4 0 296 .207 .253 .302 .555 .283
Buehrle 4 3 4.87 12 12 0 0 0 64.2 75 46 35 12 24 9 5 279 .296 .336 .482 .818 .295
Hutchison 4 3 5.95 10 8 0 0 0 42.1 51 33 28 10 31 9 3 183 .300 .350 .535 .885 .323
Stroman 4 0 1.67 4 4 0 0 0 27.0 20 5 5 6 18 2 1 103 .208 .262 .292 .554 .237
Osuna 0 2 3.20 26 0 15 0 2 25.1 17 9 9 5 24 5 0 97 .185 .227 .424 .651 .190
Sanchez 1 2 2.59 28 0 0 10 1 24.1 15 7 7 7 17 1 1 92 .181 .253 .229 .482 .215
Cecil 3 1 0.00 26 0 0 6 1 21.0 9 2 0 1 31 0 0 74 .123 .135 .151 .286 .214
Hendriks 3 0 3.54 24 0 0 1 0 20.1 24 8 8 5 26 1 1 88 .296 .341 .420 .761 .418
Lowe 1 2 3.79 23 0 1 5 2 19.0 15 9 8 1 14 3 0 71 .224 .229 .403 .632 .231
Schultz 0 0 5.63 13 0 0 1 0 16.0 15 10 10 7 8 3 0 69 .246 .319 .443 .761 .235
Hawkins 1 0 2.93 17 0 1 4 0 15.1 22 7 5 3 13 1 0 70 .333 .362 .455 .817 .404
Francis 0 0 5.40 6 0 0 0 0 10.0 11 6 6 4 6 2 0 43 .282 .349 .436 .785 .290
Tepera 0 1 5.79 11 0 1 0 0 9.1 8 8 6 2 6 4 1 40 .216 .275 .541 .816 .148
Loup 0 0 1.17 15 0 0 1 0 7.2 11 2 1 1 8 0 2 37 .333 .389 .424 .813 .440
Delabar 0 0 27.00 4 0 0 1 0 2.1 9 7 7 2 1 2 0 18 .563 .611 1.125 1.736 .538
Jenkins 0 0 5.40 1 0 0 0 0 1.2 1 1 1 2 0 1 0 8 .167 .375 .667 1.032 .000
Once again it's almost entirely about three players: David Price, Marco Estrada, and R.A. Dickey. While Mark Buehrle faded over the final six weeks, Dickey and Estrada pitched significantly better in August and September than they had during the first part of the season. Price, of course, was simply a Massive Improvement over the ne'er-do-wells who'd been filling out the rotation. The baffling, frustrating campaign of Drew Hutchison continued on until he was supplanted by the surprising return of Marcus Stroman, who did his very best David Price imitation over the final three weeks. The bullpen was not dramatically better - Roberto Osuna and Liam Hendriks did not pitch as well over the final two months as they had earlier in the year. But the additions of veterans Lowe and Hawkins and the return of Sanchez to the pen - none of whom were great, but all of whom were serviceable - did make the relief corps much deeper, much more reliable, and much more sensible. This meant that the manager was able to define roles for his relievers. Relief pitchers are generally more effective when they understand how they're going to be used, but it was very difficult for Gibbons to sort out the roles in his pen while the tryouts were still going on. In addition, the improved performance of the starters reduced what was required from the relievers.
And Brett Cecil, over the final two months... well, I don't know what to say. Seriously, just look at those numbers. American League batters hit .123/ .135/ .151 against someone? Really? The guy struck out 31 and walked 1? That actually happened?
That's got to be about as well as any reliever has ever pitched. Hard to be better, at any rate.
