I've been working on the great Blue Jays Report Card (coming to a Batter's Box near you on Monday), and when it came to discussing the manager I thought I'd try to identify a few things the man actually does when it comes to running his team.
I got carried away. So I thought I'd best spin it off into a separate piece.
Let's forget about the cut of the man's jib, and get into some of the nuts and bolts.
1. Pinch Hitters
Gibbons has always liked using pinch-hitters - his teams led the league in pinch-hit at bats in 2005 and 2007 - but he really got into using pinch-hittiers this season. Only one AL team in the last twenty years (Tampa Bay, 2013) used as many pinch-hitters as Gibbons did this season; no Blue Jays team had used as many since Bobby Cox was platooning at anywhere up to five positions in the early 1980s. All that pinch-hitting didn't work out all that well for the 2014 Blue Jays, largely because Steve Tolleson (4-31) led the team in pinch-hit appearances. Gibbons got useful work as pinch-hitters from Lind, Navarro, Rasmus, Kawasaki, and Gose. Unfortunately, thanks largely to the aformentioned Mr Tolleson, the rest of his pinch-hitters went a frightful 16-112 (.143), in which case you might as well let your pitchers hit. His bench badly needed a useful RH bat to use against southpaw relievers (notice that his effective PH bats were 4 LH hitters and a switch-hitter).
2. Bunts
Gibbons didn't like the sac bunt when he started managing, but he's evolved some over the years. His 2006 team attempted the fewest sac bunts in the league, his 2007 team the second fewest. His split team with Gaston in 2008 was second in the league in sac attempts, which can probably be attributed to the 900 plate appearances made by Eckstein, Inglett, and McDonald. The world would soon see that Cito Gaston, a notoriously stubborn kind of fellow, definitely hadn't evolved on this issue. Gaston didn't like the bunt twenty years ago, and he clearly didn't like it any better during his second tour. Gaston's 2009 team was well below league average in bunt attempts; his 2010 team attempted a measly 22 bunts, which is about as close to zero as you can get (especially when you consider that half of those bunts were Yunel Escobar trying to bunt for a hit). Certainly, no major league team since Cito repaired to the golf course has bunted so seldom. Coming after Gaston, John Farrell seemed positively bunt-crazy - remember how we all talked about it at the time - but in truth, Farrell was just being a normal guy, getting the team back to the league average in 2011. Farrell did bunt more than the average team in 2012, and it was Gibbons who brought them back down to league average in 2013. This season, though, Gibbons' team was well above the league average in bunts attempted. Some of this, obviously, was a response to the people in his lineup - the bottom of his batting order was frequently awash in non-hitters, and those are the people you bunt with. Both Kawasaki and Goins did a decent job getting the sac bunt accomplished; Anthony Gose has some work to do.
3. Relief Pitchers
Last year Gibbons (like Gaston and Farrell before him ) went to to the bullpen more often than the average AL manager. None of them went to the pen often enough to actually lead the league in relievers used (Farrell did come pretty close in both of his seasons here) but all three were above the league average. But not this year - Gibbons' relievers have pitched about the same number of innings as other AL bullpens - but he hasn't used nearly as many relief pitchers. There were two reasons for this: 1) Gibbons doesn't really have a pitcher he uses to get just one out, and 2) his bullpen had not one, but two pitchers he used as Long Men. There were 90 AL pitchers who made 30 relief appearances; Todd Redmond (1.79 IP per game) was the only one to average more than 1.5 IP per appearance and Chad Jenkins (1.49 IP per game) was used the same way. Only 4 AL pitchers threw more relief innings than Redmond, but no less than 75 AL pitchers made more appearances out of the bullpen.
4. Intentional Walks
Like a lot of managers, Gibbons has been all over the map when it comes to this tactic. Unless you have a strong philosophical objection to the thing in the first place, what this is usually going to reflect is the nature of your bullpen, how much confidence you have in the guy on the mound at that moment, and game situations (most IBBs are issued when you're behind in the game, obviously.). Gibbons was one of the AL's stingiest managers with the intentional pass this season, handing out just 23 of them; 19 of the 23 were issued by relief pitchers. It's one of the lowest figures in franchise history (Jim Fregosi's pitchers issued just 19 of them in 2000.) It's noteworthy because back in 2006, Gibbons' team issued 56 IBBs, one of the highest figures in franchise history. That year, Gibbons had his starting pitchers giving out free passes (25 IBBs) - Roy Halladay himself handed out 5 IBBs. The franchise record, by the way, is the 65 IBBs Jimy Williams had his pitchers issue in 1987. That's just... inexplicable. History will never, never be able to explain why a 96 win team, with the best ERA in the league, walked so many people on purpose.
5. Double Plays
Gibbons' teams have on occasion had trouble staying out of the double play. His team was near the league lead in 2006, and in 2008 it actually became a crisis - they were hitting into them at such a pace that they were threatening to set an AL record. This rendered the offense so totally dysfunctional that it cost Gibbons his job. Cito Gaston fixed this problem - somehow, I don't know how - and GIDPs weren't a problem during Gaston's second tour or when John Farrell ran the team. Which brings us to Gibbons' teams the last two years. They have indeed hit into a few more double plays than your average team, but this hasn't been anywhere near the problem it used to be. This year's team also had a lot of people on base. That's always a good thing, but when you do that there will be a few DPs. Considering that the heart of the batting order featured two RH sluggers (one of Casey Stengel's bete noires!) this could have easily been worse. It is curious that the Blue Jays scored fewer runs than Oakland - Toronto had more people on base, and hit with more power. (But we probably need to look at this the other way round - the real mystery was how Oakland scored as many runs as they did.) The Toronto offence was just fine. They were fourth in the league in runs scored, they scored more runs than all the other teams in their own division. This team's problems were all about preventing the other team from scoring.
6. Luck
As you probably remember, John Gibbons managed one of the most spectacularly unlucky teams in major league history. His 2005 squad was just the third team in the history of the game, going back into the 19th century, to outscore the opposition by 70 runs and still post a losing record. Just an amazing... accomplishment? Anyway, they achieved that remarkable feat by going a horrid 16-31 in one-run games which is... well, it's almost impossible. It's utterly mind-boggling. One-run games are mostly a matter of Dumb Luck, and just one year later Gibbons' 2006 team was very, very good (20-10) in close games, his 2007 team was pretty good. But then came 2008, and Gibbons' team repeated the experience of 2005 all over again, only worse - in just less than half a season, they went an appalling 8-18 in one-run games (they went 16-14 for Gaston.) Random luck, from game to game, is much, much more significant in the Grand Scheme of All Things Baseball than I think people generally appreciate. I know I'd prefer to have a certifiably Lucky Guy in charge. But you just never know with this stuff. Anyway, to this point the 2014 Blue Jays outscored the oppostion by 36 runs, and could have been expected to have won 84 games. They haven't, but they're not far off. They've been a little unlucky, going 15-19 in one-run games. Not good, but not that big a deal.
I got carried away. So I thought I'd best spin it off into a separate piece.
Let's forget about the cut of the man's jib, and get into some of the nuts and bolts.
1. Pinch Hitters
Gibbons has always liked using pinch-hitters - his teams led the league in pinch-hit at bats in 2005 and 2007 - but he really got into using pinch-hittiers this season. Only one AL team in the last twenty years (Tampa Bay, 2013) used as many pinch-hitters as Gibbons did this season; no Blue Jays team had used as many since Bobby Cox was platooning at anywhere up to five positions in the early 1980s. All that pinch-hitting didn't work out all that well for the 2014 Blue Jays, largely because Steve Tolleson (4-31) led the team in pinch-hit appearances. Gibbons got useful work as pinch-hitters from Lind, Navarro, Rasmus, Kawasaki, and Gose. Unfortunately, thanks largely to the aformentioned Mr Tolleson, the rest of his pinch-hitters went a frightful 16-112 (.143), in which case you might as well let your pitchers hit. His bench badly needed a useful RH bat to use against southpaw relievers (notice that his effective PH bats were 4 LH hitters and a switch-hitter).
2. Bunts
Gibbons didn't like the sac bunt when he started managing, but he's evolved some over the years. His 2006 team attempted the fewest sac bunts in the league, his 2007 team the second fewest. His split team with Gaston in 2008 was second in the league in sac attempts, which can probably be attributed to the 900 plate appearances made by Eckstein, Inglett, and McDonald. The world would soon see that Cito Gaston, a notoriously stubborn kind of fellow, definitely hadn't evolved on this issue. Gaston didn't like the bunt twenty years ago, and he clearly didn't like it any better during his second tour. Gaston's 2009 team was well below league average in bunt attempts; his 2010 team attempted a measly 22 bunts, which is about as close to zero as you can get (especially when you consider that half of those bunts were Yunel Escobar trying to bunt for a hit). Certainly, no major league team since Cito repaired to the golf course has bunted so seldom. Coming after Gaston, John Farrell seemed positively bunt-crazy - remember how we all talked about it at the time - but in truth, Farrell was just being a normal guy, getting the team back to the league average in 2011. Farrell did bunt more than the average team in 2012, and it was Gibbons who brought them back down to league average in 2013. This season, though, Gibbons' team was well above the league average in bunts attempted. Some of this, obviously, was a response to the people in his lineup - the bottom of his batting order was frequently awash in non-hitters, and those are the people you bunt with. Both Kawasaki and Goins did a decent job getting the sac bunt accomplished; Anthony Gose has some work to do.
3. Relief Pitchers
Last year Gibbons (like Gaston and Farrell before him ) went to to the bullpen more often than the average AL manager. None of them went to the pen often enough to actually lead the league in relievers used (Farrell did come pretty close in both of his seasons here) but all three were above the league average. But not this year - Gibbons' relievers have pitched about the same number of innings as other AL bullpens - but he hasn't used nearly as many relief pitchers. There were two reasons for this: 1) Gibbons doesn't really have a pitcher he uses to get just one out, and 2) his bullpen had not one, but two pitchers he used as Long Men. There were 90 AL pitchers who made 30 relief appearances; Todd Redmond (1.79 IP per game) was the only one to average more than 1.5 IP per appearance and Chad Jenkins (1.49 IP per game) was used the same way. Only 4 AL pitchers threw more relief innings than Redmond, but no less than 75 AL pitchers made more appearances out of the bullpen.
4. Intentional Walks
Like a lot of managers, Gibbons has been all over the map when it comes to this tactic. Unless you have a strong philosophical objection to the thing in the first place, what this is usually going to reflect is the nature of your bullpen, how much confidence you have in the guy on the mound at that moment, and game situations (most IBBs are issued when you're behind in the game, obviously.). Gibbons was one of the AL's stingiest managers with the intentional pass this season, handing out just 23 of them; 19 of the 23 were issued by relief pitchers. It's one of the lowest figures in franchise history (Jim Fregosi's pitchers issued just 19 of them in 2000.) It's noteworthy because back in 2006, Gibbons' team issued 56 IBBs, one of the highest figures in franchise history. That year, Gibbons had his starting pitchers giving out free passes (25 IBBs) - Roy Halladay himself handed out 5 IBBs. The franchise record, by the way, is the 65 IBBs Jimy Williams had his pitchers issue in 1987. That's just... inexplicable. History will never, never be able to explain why a 96 win team, with the best ERA in the league, walked so many people on purpose.
5. Double Plays
Gibbons' teams have on occasion had trouble staying out of the double play. His team was near the league lead in 2006, and in 2008 it actually became a crisis - they were hitting into them at such a pace that they were threatening to set an AL record. This rendered the offense so totally dysfunctional that it cost Gibbons his job. Cito Gaston fixed this problem - somehow, I don't know how - and GIDPs weren't a problem during Gaston's second tour or when John Farrell ran the team. Which brings us to Gibbons' teams the last two years. They have indeed hit into a few more double plays than your average team, but this hasn't been anywhere near the problem it used to be. This year's team also had a lot of people on base. That's always a good thing, but when you do that there will be a few DPs. Considering that the heart of the batting order featured two RH sluggers (one of Casey Stengel's bete noires!) this could have easily been worse. It is curious that the Blue Jays scored fewer runs than Oakland - Toronto had more people on base, and hit with more power. (But we probably need to look at this the other way round - the real mystery was how Oakland scored as many runs as they did.) The Toronto offence was just fine. They were fourth in the league in runs scored, they scored more runs than all the other teams in their own division. This team's problems were all about preventing the other team from scoring.
6. Luck
As you probably remember, John Gibbons managed one of the most spectacularly unlucky teams in major league history. His 2005 squad was just the third team in the history of the game, going back into the 19th century, to outscore the opposition by 70 runs and still post a losing record. Just an amazing... accomplishment? Anyway, they achieved that remarkable feat by going a horrid 16-31 in one-run games which is... well, it's almost impossible. It's utterly mind-boggling. One-run games are mostly a matter of Dumb Luck, and just one year later Gibbons' 2006 team was very, very good (20-10) in close games, his 2007 team was pretty good. But then came 2008, and Gibbons' team repeated the experience of 2005 all over again, only worse - in just less than half a season, they went an appalling 8-18 in one-run games (they went 16-14 for Gaston.) Random luck, from game to game, is much, much more significant in the Grand Scheme of All Things Baseball than I think people generally appreciate. I know I'd prefer to have a certifiably Lucky Guy in charge. But you just never know with this stuff. Anyway, to this point the 2014 Blue Jays outscored the oppostion by 36 runs, and could have been expected to have won 84 games. They haven't, but they're not far off. They've been a little unlucky, going 15-19 in one-run games. Not good, but not that big a deal.
