With the trading deadline coming up, I thought that I would take a closer look at the most lopsided trades of my lifetime. Not all of them occurred at or near the deadline, but they did share a common theme of "present for future", at least from the perception of the trade partners. I am interested not in the how deals ended up, as the facts are pretty well known in all five cases. Rather, I am interested in how the deals looked objectively at the time that they were made.
June 15, 1964- Lou Brock
The Cubs traded Lou Brock, Jack Russell Spring, and Paul Toth to the Cards for Ernie Broglio, Bobby Shantz, and Doug Clemens. This deal had a signficant influence on the outcome of the 1964, 1967, 1968, 1969 and 1970 seasons in the National League.
Brock turned out to be the key player in the deal. He was signed as an undrafted free agent out of college by the Cubs in 1961 and proceeded to hit .361 and slug .535 in A ball that year. He turned 22 in June. Instead of promoting him, the Cubs rewarded him with a late season call-up. He had a more or less regular job with the Cubs in 1962 and 1963, hitting .260 with some pop, below average but not terrible walk and K rates, and excellent speed but mediocre stolen base success rates. At that point, his BBRef comps included Von Hayes, Lee Walls, Bernie Williams, Alex Rios, Ray Lankford and Marquis Grissom. He started off 1964 weakly, and then exploded after the trade to lead the Cards to the World Series title, and was a key figure in their 1967 and 1968 pennant-winning clubs.
Ernie Broglio was the key to the deal from the Cubs' perspective. He had been a very fine pitcher through age 27 in 1963 and had thrown 1000 innings. At that point, his BBRef comparable list, included J.R. Richard, Dennis Leonard, Jack Morris, Bruce Kison, Kirby Higbe, Al Downing, Kerry Wood, Scott Sanderson and Steve Busby. After age 27, Broglio was by far the worst of them, but the recurring theme was arm problems. He started off 1964 poorly, and according to one account, both Broglio and the Cardinals were well aware that he had significant arm problems. But, the Cubs probably did not, and that was the key to the deal.
It was, in my view, predictable that Lou Brock would develop and become a good player, although the balance of power and speed was not. I would personally view Brock's 1962 and 1963 statistics with less caution than others might because of his rapid promotion in 1961. His position as a leadoff hitter and the park in St. Louis likely caused him to emphasize the speed part of his game, but in another environment (such as Chicago), it is easy to imagine the power side of his game developing more fully. At that, the deal would likely have worked out reasonably well for the Cubs if Broglio had been healthy.
Lesson 1: don't trade for sore-armed pitchers (and don't trade players named after dogs)
December 15, 1971- Nolan Ryan
The Mets traded Nolan Ryan and three other players to the Angels for Jim Fregosi. The deal actually probably did not change much in the actual standings in succeeding years, because Ryan's presence was not enough for the Angels to win in the 1970s. He might have helped the Mets win another World Series in 1973 had he still been there.
Ryan was 24 years old at the time of the trade. He was signed in the 12th round of the 1965 draft by the Mets, and reported to the Appy League. He was 18. He posted a 4.38 ERA with 56 walks and 115 strikeouts in 78 innings. That's Nolan Ryan, all right. Promoted to A ball the next year, he went 17-2 with a 2.51 ERA and 127 walks and 272 strikeouts in 183 innings. I'm guessing that he was throwing 100 mph roughly by then. He made his way to the Mets, and was a league-average pitcher from 1968-71 throwing under 160 innings per year and with very good strikeout rates and very poor control. During his time with California, his control and his strikeout rate improved a smide, and he was an above-average pitcher. This was entirely normal development.
Fregosi had been a great shortstop through age 29 in 1970. He was an MVP candidate every year. At the end of his age 29 year, his BBRef comparables were excellent; the closest ones were Ryne Sandberg, Lou Whitaker and Alan Trammell. In 1971, he was hobbled by a chronic foot injury, lost his range and his hitting went to pot. He had played part of the season at first base. Foot injuries do often heal well enough for a player's hitting not to suffer in the long run, but the Mets put him at third base in 1972 and it seemed that he never recovered. The strange thing is that if he had been given a year off, and then installed as a first baseman/DH for the Angels, he might have had a half-decent career in his 30s.
Lesson 2: don't trade for sore-footed position players intending to use them at a mobility-dependent position
December 8, 1982- Fred McGriff
Can we revel in this one? The Yankees traded McGriff, Dave Collins, Mike Morgan and cash (actually, greenbacks), to the Blue Jays for Dale Murray and Tom Dodds. The motivation for the deal from the Yankee perspective was apparently the signing of Steve Kemp to a 5 year contract as a free agent, which left Collins without a role.
We know where McGriff ended up, but where was he at the end of 1982? He had been drafted in the 9th round by the Yankees in 1981 out of high school, and washed out in 81 at-bats in Rookie League that year. He reported back to the Gulf Coast League in 1982 and at age 18 had hit .272/.413/.456 with 9 homers, 48 walks and 63 strikeouts in 217 at-bats. Subjective reports that he had significant power were already there, and there was nothing in his GCL record that suggested to the contrary. His strikeout rate though was very high, and bearing in mind that he was in Rookie League, there was significant doubt about whether he would emerge as a major leaguer, let alone one of the all-time greats at first base.
Collins had been an average player overall, and continued to be one in Toronto. Murray was 32 years old, and had been a decent reliever in his career but nothing special. He had enjoyed the best year of his career in 1981, but there was absolutely nothing to indicate that he had made a leap forward and to expect that he would be anything but a serviceable middle reliever. Looking back at this trade, the Yankees' decision to trade McGriff does not appear as unwise as some of the other trades here.
Lesson 3: Watch the minor league throw-ins.
August 30, 1990- Jeff Bagwell
During a pennant drive, the Red Sox traded Jeff Bagwell to the Astros for Larry Anderson. Anderson was a free agent after the season, and had been a fine medium-high leverage reliever for the Astros for several years. He pitched superbly for the Sox in September, as they eked out the division title over the Jays, but then had a poor ALCS against the eventual AL pennant winning A's. Did the Sox get draft picks when Anderson signed with the Padres after the 1990 season? If so, I cannot find record of it.
Hometown boy Bagwell was drafted in the 4th round by the Red Sox out of college in 1989. He was a third baseman. In 1989, he started in high A ball in the Florida State League and hit .310/.384/.419 with an almost even W/K rate at age 21. The next year at double A New Britain, he hit .333/.422/.457 at age 22, with 34 doubles, 4 homers, 73 walks and 57 strikeouts in 481 at-bats. It was pretty clear at the time of the trade that Bagwell was going to be a major leaguer and likely hit .300 with a good number of walks, but his power development was unclear.
Again this deal does not look as bad at the time as I thought.
Lesson 4: Be leery of trading a sure-fire prospect for a 1 month rental of a reliever.
November 14, 2003- Joe Nathan, Francisco Liriano and Boof Bonser
Faced with the pleasant problem of possessing catchers Joe Mauer and A.J. Pierzynski, Twins' GM Terry Ryan made the most of it by dealing Pierzynski to the Giants for Nathan, Liriano and Bonser.
Pierzynski had been a fine catcher for the Twins at age 25-26, hitting .300, drawing a few walks and hitting with some power. He had an off-year for the Giants in 2004, was released, and ended up with the World Series champion White Sox the following year and made a significant contribution. His development after age 26 so far has not been ideal, but perfectly normal for a catcher.
Nathan was 29 years old at the time of the trade, and had been a 6th round pick in 1995. He had been a starter for many years in the Giant system without success. In 2003, the Giants moved him into the pen at the major league level, and he had a very good season, putting up a 2.96 ERA, but more impressively walking 33 and striking out 83 in 79 innings. He was used primarily in the 7th and 8th inning, most often in tie games and ended up with 12 wins on the year. The Twins correctly divined that he was closer material, and the rest (well, at least part of it) is history.
Liriano was 20 years old at the time of the trade in 2003, and had been signed at age 17. He had pitched very well in the Sally League at age 18, walking 31 and striking out 85 in 80 innings of work. He had missed almost all of 2003 with an arm injury. Since the trade, he has pitched very well in the high minors, brilliantly in the majors for half a season and is now out after Tommy John surgery. My own view is that he is much more likely to have a career if he is placed in the bullpen, but that view is not accepted by everyone.
Bonser was a 1st round pick in the 2000 draft out of high school. At age 19 in 2001, he went 16-4 with a 2.94 ERA in the Sally League with 178 strikeouts in 134 innings. He followed that up with an 8-6 2.88 ERA and 139 strikeouts in 128 innings in the high A California League at age 20. His first round in double A in 2003 did not go quite so well, a 4.00 ERA with 67 walks and 103 strikeouts in 135 innings. Since the trade, he has advanced up the Twin minor league system, and pitched fairly well as a starter for the Twins over the last year. He turns 26 in October, and it would not shock me if he had an excellent career in the rotation.
The summary of this trade is pretty simple. Pierzynski is a perfectly acceptable catcher, but to give up Nathan and Liriano and Bonser is just way too much on any view of the situation.
Lesson 5: Don't be a doofus. Trade value for value.
These lopsided deals seem to have been happening about once per decade, and the motivations and mistakes seem to vary from deal to deal.
June 15, 1964- Lou Brock
The Cubs traded Lou Brock, Jack Russell Spring, and Paul Toth to the Cards for Ernie Broglio, Bobby Shantz, and Doug Clemens. This deal had a signficant influence on the outcome of the 1964, 1967, 1968, 1969 and 1970 seasons in the National League.
Brock turned out to be the key player in the deal. He was signed as an undrafted free agent out of college by the Cubs in 1961 and proceeded to hit .361 and slug .535 in A ball that year. He turned 22 in June. Instead of promoting him, the Cubs rewarded him with a late season call-up. He had a more or less regular job with the Cubs in 1962 and 1963, hitting .260 with some pop, below average but not terrible walk and K rates, and excellent speed but mediocre stolen base success rates. At that point, his BBRef comps included Von Hayes, Lee Walls, Bernie Williams, Alex Rios, Ray Lankford and Marquis Grissom. He started off 1964 weakly, and then exploded after the trade to lead the Cards to the World Series title, and was a key figure in their 1967 and 1968 pennant-winning clubs.
Ernie Broglio was the key to the deal from the Cubs' perspective. He had been a very fine pitcher through age 27 in 1963 and had thrown 1000 innings. At that point, his BBRef comparable list, included J.R. Richard, Dennis Leonard, Jack Morris, Bruce Kison, Kirby Higbe, Al Downing, Kerry Wood, Scott Sanderson and Steve Busby. After age 27, Broglio was by far the worst of them, but the recurring theme was arm problems. He started off 1964 poorly, and according to one account, both Broglio and the Cardinals were well aware that he had significant arm problems. But, the Cubs probably did not, and that was the key to the deal.
It was, in my view, predictable that Lou Brock would develop and become a good player, although the balance of power and speed was not. I would personally view Brock's 1962 and 1963 statistics with less caution than others might because of his rapid promotion in 1961. His position as a leadoff hitter and the park in St. Louis likely caused him to emphasize the speed part of his game, but in another environment (such as Chicago), it is easy to imagine the power side of his game developing more fully. At that, the deal would likely have worked out reasonably well for the Cubs if Broglio had been healthy.
Lesson 1: don't trade for sore-armed pitchers (and don't trade players named after dogs)
December 15, 1971- Nolan Ryan
The Mets traded Nolan Ryan and three other players to the Angels for Jim Fregosi. The deal actually probably did not change much in the actual standings in succeeding years, because Ryan's presence was not enough for the Angels to win in the 1970s. He might have helped the Mets win another World Series in 1973 had he still been there.
Ryan was 24 years old at the time of the trade. He was signed in the 12th round of the 1965 draft by the Mets, and reported to the Appy League. He was 18. He posted a 4.38 ERA with 56 walks and 115 strikeouts in 78 innings. That's Nolan Ryan, all right. Promoted to A ball the next year, he went 17-2 with a 2.51 ERA and 127 walks and 272 strikeouts in 183 innings. I'm guessing that he was throwing 100 mph roughly by then. He made his way to the Mets, and was a league-average pitcher from 1968-71 throwing under 160 innings per year and with very good strikeout rates and very poor control. During his time with California, his control and his strikeout rate improved a smide, and he was an above-average pitcher. This was entirely normal development.
Fregosi had been a great shortstop through age 29 in 1970. He was an MVP candidate every year. At the end of his age 29 year, his BBRef comparables were excellent; the closest ones were Ryne Sandberg, Lou Whitaker and Alan Trammell. In 1971, he was hobbled by a chronic foot injury, lost his range and his hitting went to pot. He had played part of the season at first base. Foot injuries do often heal well enough for a player's hitting not to suffer in the long run, but the Mets put him at third base in 1972 and it seemed that he never recovered. The strange thing is that if he had been given a year off, and then installed as a first baseman/DH for the Angels, he might have had a half-decent career in his 30s.
Lesson 2: don't trade for sore-footed position players intending to use them at a mobility-dependent position
December 8, 1982- Fred McGriff
Can we revel in this one? The Yankees traded McGriff, Dave Collins, Mike Morgan and cash (actually, greenbacks), to the Blue Jays for Dale Murray and Tom Dodds. The motivation for the deal from the Yankee perspective was apparently the signing of Steve Kemp to a 5 year contract as a free agent, which left Collins without a role.
We know where McGriff ended up, but where was he at the end of 1982? He had been drafted in the 9th round by the Yankees in 1981 out of high school, and washed out in 81 at-bats in Rookie League that year. He reported back to the Gulf Coast League in 1982 and at age 18 had hit .272/.413/.456 with 9 homers, 48 walks and 63 strikeouts in 217 at-bats. Subjective reports that he had significant power were already there, and there was nothing in his GCL record that suggested to the contrary. His strikeout rate though was very high, and bearing in mind that he was in Rookie League, there was significant doubt about whether he would emerge as a major leaguer, let alone one of the all-time greats at first base.
Collins had been an average player overall, and continued to be one in Toronto. Murray was 32 years old, and had been a decent reliever in his career but nothing special. He had enjoyed the best year of his career in 1981, but there was absolutely nothing to indicate that he had made a leap forward and to expect that he would be anything but a serviceable middle reliever. Looking back at this trade, the Yankees' decision to trade McGriff does not appear as unwise as some of the other trades here.
Lesson 3: Watch the minor league throw-ins.
August 30, 1990- Jeff Bagwell
During a pennant drive, the Red Sox traded Jeff Bagwell to the Astros for Larry Anderson. Anderson was a free agent after the season, and had been a fine medium-high leverage reliever for the Astros for several years. He pitched superbly for the Sox in September, as they eked out the division title over the Jays, but then had a poor ALCS against the eventual AL pennant winning A's. Did the Sox get draft picks when Anderson signed with the Padres after the 1990 season? If so, I cannot find record of it.
Hometown boy Bagwell was drafted in the 4th round by the Red Sox out of college in 1989. He was a third baseman. In 1989, he started in high A ball in the Florida State League and hit .310/.384/.419 with an almost even W/K rate at age 21. The next year at double A New Britain, he hit .333/.422/.457 at age 22, with 34 doubles, 4 homers, 73 walks and 57 strikeouts in 481 at-bats. It was pretty clear at the time of the trade that Bagwell was going to be a major leaguer and likely hit .300 with a good number of walks, but his power development was unclear.
Again this deal does not look as bad at the time as I thought.
Lesson 4: Be leery of trading a sure-fire prospect for a 1 month rental of a reliever.
November 14, 2003- Joe Nathan, Francisco Liriano and Boof Bonser
Faced with the pleasant problem of possessing catchers Joe Mauer and A.J. Pierzynski, Twins' GM Terry Ryan made the most of it by dealing Pierzynski to the Giants for Nathan, Liriano and Bonser.
Pierzynski had been a fine catcher for the Twins at age 25-26, hitting .300, drawing a few walks and hitting with some power. He had an off-year for the Giants in 2004, was released, and ended up with the World Series champion White Sox the following year and made a significant contribution. His development after age 26 so far has not been ideal, but perfectly normal for a catcher.
Nathan was 29 years old at the time of the trade, and had been a 6th round pick in 1995. He had been a starter for many years in the Giant system without success. In 2003, the Giants moved him into the pen at the major league level, and he had a very good season, putting up a 2.96 ERA, but more impressively walking 33 and striking out 83 in 79 innings. He was used primarily in the 7th and 8th inning, most often in tie games and ended up with 12 wins on the year. The Twins correctly divined that he was closer material, and the rest (well, at least part of it) is history.
Liriano was 20 years old at the time of the trade in 2003, and had been signed at age 17. He had pitched very well in the Sally League at age 18, walking 31 and striking out 85 in 80 innings of work. He had missed almost all of 2003 with an arm injury. Since the trade, he has pitched very well in the high minors, brilliantly in the majors for half a season and is now out after Tommy John surgery. My own view is that he is much more likely to have a career if he is placed in the bullpen, but that view is not accepted by everyone.
Bonser was a 1st round pick in the 2000 draft out of high school. At age 19 in 2001, he went 16-4 with a 2.94 ERA in the Sally League with 178 strikeouts in 134 innings. He followed that up with an 8-6 2.88 ERA and 139 strikeouts in 128 innings in the high A California League at age 20. His first round in double A in 2003 did not go quite so well, a 4.00 ERA with 67 walks and 103 strikeouts in 135 innings. Since the trade, he has advanced up the Twin minor league system, and pitched fairly well as a starter for the Twins over the last year. He turns 26 in October, and it would not shock me if he had an excellent career in the rotation.
The summary of this trade is pretty simple. Pierzynski is a perfectly acceptable catcher, but to give up Nathan and Liriano and Bonser is just way too much on any view of the situation.
Lesson 5: Don't be a doofus. Trade value for value.
These lopsided deals seem to have been happening about once per decade, and the motivations and mistakes seem to vary from deal to deal.
