Meanwhile, over in the Sun, Buck Martinez, Master of Hindsight, regales us with his stale wisdom.  "I always knew that Cesar Izturis/Cris Carpenter/Eric Hinske would turn out like that!"  If your 2003 fantasy draft is coming up, make sure to find out from Buck who are the best players to draft.

Buck also called his disastrous, inept failure at managing Team USA at the World Baseball Classic "the best experience I ever had in a baseball uniform,"  which is too funny for words.  Really, Buck?  Was it even better than Jim Sundberg's triple that stabbed you in the heart in '85?  Twit.

 "J.P. said (Carpenter) didn't have the heart to be anything more than a .500 pitcher," Martinez said. "He said we can get Cezar Izturis any day of the week."

Line of the night, by one Jamie Campbell:

"He's not Troy Glaus anymore, he's TROY GLAUS-OME!!!" (just after his second homer).

Too good not to repeat.

My jaw literally hit the floor after that one; I wondered for a good 10 minutes if he really said that. He also used a funny, like western accent at some other point in the game. Really reminded me of some Chuck Swirsky-isms like OH MY BOSH! And even though the consensus on Batter's Box seems to be that the Swirsk sucks, I think it's amazing the enthusiasm he brings to the Raps. I think Jamie's just strange enough that he has the potential to be the most off the wall broadcaster in baseball.

I have been lurking the BTF discussion of the Slam article that Craig linked above.  There are some serious fallacies being thrown around there, primarily the notion that the Hinske signing was a mistake.

Here - for dramatic effect - is a list of the AL third basemen who out-VORPed Hinske in 2002:

... [nil]

Hinske finished 35th in the majors in VORP that season, higher than Eric Chavez (38), Troy Glaus (60) and Scott Rolen (79), to name a few famous third basemen.  He hit .373/.486 in for the Cubs in AA in 2000 and .365/.521 for the A's in AAA in 2001.  In 2002, he hit .365/.481 in Toronto. 

PECOTA had him projected at .362/.497 for 2003.

It was a great deal when it was signed, and the quality of the decision to sign is entirely unaffected by the eventual results.  The hindsight horseshit that is going on at BTF in infuriating.

Here is what Joe Sheehan - who nobody will accuse of JP apologism -  wrote on March 19, 2003:

"In both cases, though, I think the Blue Jays have done well to commit to these players. There are reasons to do so that go beyond the specific merit. The Jays can now sell Wells and Hinske to their fans as the cornerstones of what should be an exciting team, a contender. They get cost certainty, as well as roster certainty, with two of their best players through 2007, enabling them to budget around the pair. If the two develop as hoped, they'll provide the kind of low-cost core that enables J.P. Ricciardi to sign the right free agents in 2004 and beyond, when the Jays should be overtaking the Red Sox and Yankees for AL East superiority.

Overall, the signings are a calculated risk with minimal downside and significant upside."

Scathing indeed.

It is okay to be critical of a GMs moves, but the critics should have the same temporal constraints as JP: judge the quality of the decision before the results come in, not after (or, alternatively, do it afterward but without regard to the results).

I must say I find the debate revolving around judging decisions based on rationale at the time rather than results or outcome fascinating.

On the one hand I can see the argument for evaluating trades and FA moves based on a view at the time of the transaction

However, the fact remains that in no other business would a CEO (and that is what JP is) be judged based on the rationale behind a trade rather than the results of one.

The CEO of Time Warner's rationale for linking up with AOL was fundamentally sound at the time of the deal- the linking of internet content and service provider seemed a match made in heaven. The future. People were lining up to herald a new dawn in which these companies would dominate through all media portals.

In the end, the move destroyed share holder value and AOL was separated from the rest of the business-  with the CEO carrying the can, despite the much touted sound logic behind the deal.

Ultimately the players are evaluated on results- surely trades should not be SO different.

The point raised about positive results following 'negative reaction' trades is also valid- Does the GM not get the credit for seeing ssomething we didn't?

Remember- our evaluation of trades and FA signings is based on ALOT less information than JP has (including health/personal/contract clauses etc...).To me the results have to play a role in evaluation- we don't have enoough information re. who else is available, health...... to make a definitive judgement 'at the time'

Whether or not it was a good risk is a matter of fact

Actually it's not.  It's a matter of opinion. 

I said it in the other thread and I will say it again.  J.P. Riccardi is paid to tell the future.  I am an underwriting manager.  My entire life revolves around making decisions about risk based on incomplete data. 

I have similar tools to Riccardi:

• Some statistical information - which at times can be difficult to translate
• Opinions from those who work under me and alongside me
• Experience from which to draw parallels from similar situations from the past

We also have a process that we have developed over time that I trust.  While I certainly agree that the process is key, ignoring the results is just going to cause you to continue to commit the same 'mistakes' (using my definition of the word).  I have always preached to those above me and below me that we must reward the process and not just the results because we look at sample sizes (say a fiscal year) and we work in a market segment where there is inherent short term variation. 

I'm not looking to get into a discussion specifically about Hinske, but using that as an example:  The fact that PECOTA liked him doesn't mean that Riccardi didn't make a mistake.  I have many computer models that I can use that will spit out what I should do.  What my company pays me for, and what Rodgers pays Riccardi for is for our expertise above and beyond what a computer model can tell you.  If PECOTA could identify players better then the average major league GM, then owners could save the hundreds of thousands of dollars they spend a year and replace them with a $4.99 a month subscription to Baseball Prospectus. 

Riccardi is paid to get better results then PECOTA, or knowledgeable fans on the internet or Jeff Blair.  He's supposed to be able to take the information that is available to him and make decisions that result in positive outcomes.  If too many of his decisions don't have positive outcomes then it isn't time to excuse them by saying the process is sound - it's time to reinvent the process.  

Certainly it's a difficult process to judge everything a general manager does because it's impossible to be correct the vast majority of the time.  Winning in baseball is turning 2 dimes in a quarter over and over until you've got a few more dollars then your competition.  Decisions need to be made quickly and the results that could change the process take years to manifest themselves.  I still hold that is not a reason to ignore the results.

Whether something is a good risk or not is, necessarily, a matter of fact.

I guess in a vaccum maybe it's a matter of fact.  In the context of most of the disagreements between the very reasonable people who post on this site, it's nearly impossible to discern who is right and who is wrong.  If there was there wouldn't be much discussion. 

I don't really think we are really that much in disagreement.  I certainly believe that the process is key in any situation.  I just think that because you need to be able to test the system, the results do matter.  An example:  The way that the Blue Jays approach the draft.  I am certain that Riccardi and the Jays' braintrust believes in the process they are using.  I know that there are some very bright people on this site who can write very well who can make excellent arguments in support of the way that they approach the draft.  However, I think it might be time to take a look at the state of the system and say... maybe this approach isn't working and it's time to find a new strategy.  Now, I know that I can't prove that the approach is wrong - there are some prospects, some more might develop and it could be anything from the quality of the minor league coaching to bad luck with injuries that is holding some potentially good players back.  Also, it's a small sample size in the larger picture, it could be the perfect strategy, but still have poor results over 3 or 4 drafts.  You'll never get a truly reliable sample size and there are many outside factors in play that can't be isolated, so you've got no choice but to look at the results and make your adjustments.

I was going to have a snack, but there is no more room in my mouth,

I know I quoted a small piece of your post, I apologize if it seemed like I was responding to just your comments.  I was really just speaking in generalities and didn't mean to make it seem differently.  I knew you weren't trying to say that PECOTA said one thing or another about the signing, I was in a rush and didn't do a good job of explaining myself in that section.

but Jim as I am sure you know the number of decisions with "positive outcomes" is a horrible way to judge the relative success of a process.

I was talking about the net worth really.  I don't disagree with what you are saying in theory.  In reality there is a different process as it relates to signing a Ryan or Burnett, versus signing Jason Phillips.

I was talking about a long term approach.  For example, I think it's safe to say that Billy Beane has a better draft 'process' then Allard Baird does.  Now this might still be wrong, because I'm basing it on the results the two men have had, but it would be hard to argue otherwise and still seem sane.