Much angst has been in evidence regarding the Blue Jays' bullpen, which collectively has not had a good outing in some time.
By searching through the game logs, I've compiled some data on Toronto relief pitchers for 2003:
The sample is far too small to draw any firm conclusions, so let's look at big league performance, 2000-2002 from the veteran pitchers. The last column is the difference between actual and expected hits given up by the pitcher on balls in play. Note that Pete Walker and Doug Creek have so far been "lucky" in this department, and Cliff Politte, Kelvim Escobar and Trever Miller have been unlucky. The bullpen has struck out only 15% of batters faced, which is a concern.
Escobar was primarily a starter in 2000, so I excluded his numbers from that year; most of Pete Walker's numbers are from last year's stint with the Jays.
Doug Creek is a power pitcher who has only struck out 1 batter in 14 opportunities so far this year. That is worrisome because he gives up tons of homeruns and walks. Here is his year-by-year breakdown:
The rate at which a pitcher strikes out batters, and by that I mean strikeouts per batters faced (subtracting intentional walks), is the most important single stat that can be applied to a pitcher. This is especially true of minor league pitchers, since they are going to lose a certain percentage of their strikeouts when they make the transition to the major leagues. If you can't strikeout a lot of minor league hitters you're going to be in real trouble in the majors.
Doug Creek's strikeout rate has been in alarming decline over the last three years. Striking out nearly 28% of batters in 2000, success is still possible despite high walk and homerun rates. Those days appear to be long gone for Creek.
Jeff Tam, despite his low strikeout rate, can survive because he hardly ever gives up homeruns or walks. He induces many groundballs and therefore has to rely on good interior defence (to turn them into outs). In 2000 and 2001, Tam allowed hits on balls in play at almost exactly the rate of his team overall (+0.9 combined). But in 2002, he was a -9.8, which means that he gave up almost 10 more hits than could have been expected given the defensive support the Oakland pitchers received.
Taking those 10 hits and turning them into outs (ignoring the possibility that some of those could have been worth 2 outs), 40.3 IP/56 hits becomes 43.7 IP/46 hits, a much more respectable hits to IP ratio. I wouldn't bring him on too many times with 2 out and men in scoring position, but if you need a double play, he's your man.
By searching through the game logs, I've compiled some data on Toronto relief pitchers for 2003:
Name ..... App BF K W (IW) HBP HR K/opp BipAvg +/-
Tam........ 6 34 2 5 (1) 0 0 ...2 for 33 (.061) .. 9 for 27 (.333) -0.9
Politte.... 6 30 7 3 (2) 0 1 ...7 for 28 (.250) .. 9 for 19 (.474) -3.3
Walker ..... 4 26 0 3 (1) 0 1 ...0 for 25 (.000) .. 2 for 22 (.091) +4.6
Escobar .... 4 21 4 2 (0) 0 0 ...4 for 21 (.190) .. 9 for 15 (.600) -4.5
Linton ..... 4 21 5 1 (0) 0 1 ...5 for 21 (.238) .. 3 for 14 (.214) +1.2
T.Miller ... 6 19 3 1 (0) 2 1 ...3 for 19 (.159) .. 7 for 12 (.583) -3.4
Creek ...... 7 15 1 2 (1) 0 2 ...1 for 14 (.071) .. 0 for 10 (.000) +3.0
Lopez ...... 4 11 4 0 (0) 0 0 ...4 for 11 (.364) .. 2 for 7 (.286) +0.1
total ......41 177 26 17 (5) 2 6 26 for 172(.151) 41 for 126 (.325) -3.2
The sample is far too small to draw any firm conclusions, so let's look at big league performance, 2000-2002 from the veteran pitchers. The last column is the difference between actual and expected hits given up by the pitcher on balls in play. Note that Pete Walker and Doug Creek have so far been "lucky" in this department, and Cliff Politte, Kelvim Escobar and Trever Miller have been unlucky. The bullpen has struck out only 15% of batters faced, which is a concern.
Name (Years) G GS IP BF H ER HR W IW K Krate Wrate HRrate BIPavg +/-
Escobar....(01-02) 135 11 204.0 872 168 86 18 96 11 206 .239 .100 .023 .276 +14.1
Tam .......(00-02) 182 0 200.7 849 210 73 8 65 22 104 .126 .052 .010 .303 - 8.9
Creek .....(00-02) 163 0 179.0 806 157 97 27 123 10 195 .245 .144 .040 .290 + 2.4
Politte....(00-02) 103 8 158.7 664 136 61 15 63 6 145 .220 .087 .025 .276 + 6.3
Walker.....(00-02) 43 20 151.7 651 161 79 19 55 5 86 .133 .078 .032 .291 + 1.6
Escobar was primarily a starter in 2000, so I excluded his numbers from that year; most of Pete Walker's numbers are from last year's stint with the Jays.
Doug Creek is a power pitcher who has only struck out 1 batter in 14 opportunities so far this year. That is worrisome because he gives up tons of homeruns and walks. Here is his year-by-year breakdown:
Year Team G GS IP BF H ER HR W IW K Krate Wrate HRrate BIPavg +/-
2000 TampaBay 45 0 60.7 265 49 31 10 39 3 73 .279 .138 .045 .277 +3.2
2001 TampaBay 66 0 62.7 279 51 30 7 49 5 66 .241 .163 .031 .288 +1.3
2002 TB/SEA... 52 0 55.7 262 57 36 10 35 2 56 .215 .130 .045 .305 -2.1
The rate at which a pitcher strikes out batters, and by that I mean strikeouts per batters faced (subtracting intentional walks), is the most important single stat that can be applied to a pitcher. This is especially true of minor league pitchers, since they are going to lose a certain percentage of their strikeouts when they make the transition to the major leagues. If you can't strikeout a lot of minor league hitters you're going to be in real trouble in the majors.
Doug Creek's strikeout rate has been in alarming decline over the last three years. Striking out nearly 28% of batters in 2000, success is still possible despite high walk and homerun rates. Those days appear to be long gone for Creek.
Jeff Tam, despite his low strikeout rate, can survive because he hardly ever gives up homeruns or walks. He induces many groundballs and therefore has to rely on good interior defence (to turn them into outs). In 2000 and 2001, Tam allowed hits on balls in play at almost exactly the rate of his team overall (+0.9 combined). But in 2002, he was a -9.8, which means that he gave up almost 10 more hits than could have been expected given the defensive support the Oakland pitchers received.
Taking those 10 hits and turning them into outs (ignoring the possibility that some of those could have been worth 2 outs), 40.3 IP/56 hits becomes 43.7 IP/46 hits, a much more respectable hits to IP ratio. I wouldn't bring him on too many times with 2 out and men in scoring position, but if you need a double play, he's your man.
