It continues to amaze me how many people completely miss the fundamental premise of Moneyball. It's not just casual fans and blowhards who haven't actually read the book themselves. It's also analysts and journalists employed full-time in the baseball industry.

I thought I'd open up a discussion on the topic with the Batter's Box roster. Here's what we said:


Jonny:

Contrary to popular misconception, Moneyball (the concept):

- is not about emphasizing offence over defence.
- is not about drafting college players over high school players.
- is not about OBP to the exclusion of all other stats.
- is not about stats to the exclusion of scouting.

All of these were discussed in Moneyball (the book), because these were the things that made sense for a low-budget team to do given the market conditions at the time. What is Moneyball really about?

It's about exploiting inefficiencies in the market.
It's about collecting and using data as effectively as possible.
It's about questioning traditionally accepted theories.
It's about quantifying and managing risk.

If "non-Moneyball" teams start jumping on the bandwagon, drafting college players and signing big slow mashers to play the middle infield, these strategies will no longer make sense for small-market clubs, as the market prices on these commodities will rise. At that point, you'll see the truly savvy teams head in different directions altogether.

Billy Beane and the A's already seem to be doing that to some degree. Last year, they fielded one of the very best defensive teams in the majors. In this year's draft, they selected high schoolers in the 4th, 9th, and 14th rounds after not having drafted a single prep player earlier than round 18 in the previous two drafts.

Further, it's no coincidence that the Blue Jays this year drafted a lot of players who played in:

a) The Big XII - focus of limited scouting resources
b) Division II - recognition that there would be more competition than in years past for Division I players
c) The Cape Cod League and other summer leagues - making use of better data (wooden bat leagues)


Craig B:

"Euclid's famous dictum that "there is no royal road to geometry" applies equally well to baseball. There is no one, guaranteed, approach to achieve success, neither on the field, nor on the balance sheet. Any team that depends on the same principles, plans, and approaches as the other teams will not be distinguishable from the other teams; the only way they will be able to gain success will be through luck. To achieve longterm and lasting success, a baseball team - like any enterprise - has to find its own ways to success. Both of the two most successful teams in major league history - the Yankees and the Dodgers - have been guided by "the Yankee way" and "the Dodger way". Billy Beane is finding his own way, an analytical approach to the "talent market", and others are following in his footsteps, and it's proving to be successful. In the end, though, that approach isn't driven by the details (like on-base percentage or drafting college players). It's only about exploiting inefficiencies in the talent market. The real message of Moneyball isn't "OBP", it's "Be The House"."


Gwyn:

A friend of mine is convinced that before 2002 Beane and DePodesta had decided that the all-hit no-field model needed changing and fed Lewis the whole OBP over everything thesis as a huge smokescreen/diversionary tactic. Yeah, I know it doesn't really bear any close scrutiny but it's a funny idea.


Moffatt:

Moneyball at it's core is a business book, and not a baseball book. It's one of those millions of books marketed towards MBA students on "How to improve your company and WIN!!!!".


Jordan:

What struck me about the book is how much it resembles some of the best work coming out of what I only half-jokingly call the Cult of Innovation. Among the leading professional advisors, Innovation is a byword: what are you doing new and differently than everyone else? What's your niche, your twist, your first-move advantage, that which you're doing differently and better than the rest of the market? Innovation is what really sets market leaders apart -- and more importantly, sets apart the deeply satisfied practitioner from the one who's slogging along, demoralized (they're quite often the same divisions).

Moneyball is also a book about courage, and that's a difficult subject about which to write well. Beane and DePodesta come off in the book as supremely confident in themselves -- not an iota of self-doubt creeps through -- which is not likely an entirely accurate picture. I mean, everyone second-guesses themselves, unless they're pathological. But when you're doing something completely different, something that all the Conventional Wisdom tells you is just wrong, when an entire industry is ready to come down on you, then all you have to fall back on is your belief in your own values and that what you're doing is right. That's courage, and I admire the hell out of it.


Robert:

Jonny is right about what Moneyball is about, but a few points...

1) Nobody that I know of puts slow mashers in the middle infield - the only one I know of right now is Jeff Kent and he's been a second baseman for a long time.

2) I don't think the Jays drafted a lot of division 2 players, relative to other teams. Drafting Division 2 is resource-intensive because the stats are not nearly as reliably adjusted for context as division 1.

3) The Jays seemingly do put a lot of weight on Cape Cod stats. It is based on the belief that a hitter's performance with a wooden bat is fundamentally different than his performance with an aluminum bat. This is the traditional wisdom. As far as I know, there's no evidence (yet) to support such a supposition and there is evindence to suggest that aluminum bat hitting in Division 1 is as good a predictor of minor league batting as other minor league batting is. In this case, a "Moneyball" approach would be to de-emphasize Cape Cod stats. After all they are a year old and a hitter's ability can change a lot in that year. 2004 Division 1 data is more recent and therefore ought to be a better indicator of current hitting ability.


Jonny:

"Big slow mashers" was an intentional exaggeration, but your other points are well taken and, as far as I'm concerned, a great case-in-point about misunderstanding Moneyball. It's not a concept easily pinned down by an outside observer pointing to a few details or impressions. The things that struck me as Moneyball type strategies from the Blue Jay front office may not have been at all.


Leigh:

'Moneyball' is about the exploitation of inefficiencies in the marketplace; it's about stockpiling a series of advantages of varying magnitude in order to gain an edge over those who do not know that the opportunity to gain those advantages exists - or as Beane via Lewis says, being the house'.

It is a philosophy of team building wherein the most valuable asset is the one which best combines on-field value and unpopularity. It is about acquiring what has the greatest contribution to cost ratio because nobody else may want it. It is not about espousing a blind, unyielding faith in on-base percentage, it is about maintaining an allegiance to the unsexy. What's sexy this year, stolen bases and batting average? I'll take Scott Hatteberg. Oh, good-hitting middle-infielders are sexy this year? I'll take Pokey Reese. Tattoos, wacky sideburns and Ricky-from-Trailer-Park-Boys look-alikes not sexy anymore? I'll take Justin Miller, Kerry Ligtenberg and Terry Adams.

It's about winning in the cheapest and least sexy manner possible.


Gerry:

The business book section of your local bookstore carries a line of books with Guerilla in the title. Examples include Guerilla Marketing, Guerilla Sales, and Guerilla Promotion. The basic premise is how to achieve results on a low budget. The Oakland A's practice Guerilla Baseball, how to succeed on a low budget.

Around ten years ago, IIRC, Bud Selig began delivering his "small clubs cannot compete" speech. Bud believed it, as did other owners such as Carl Pohlad [Twins], David Glass [Royals] and Jeffrey Loria [Expos]. They could see that the revenue differential with the big clubs was growing and they did not know how to compete. Some of them had fire sales, some went with "youth movements". Every few years they might spend some money on some second tier free agents, especially of they were hoping to land a new stadium, only to give up again when the team did not perform as expected. They could not see how to compete.

After Steve Schott purchased the Oakland organization he cut back on their budget. Oakland did not have the same resources as the Yankees or the Texas Rangers. Oakland recognized they could not compete using the same methodology as the big clubs. While Bud, Carl and Jeffrey cried for someone else to help them out of their problems, Oakland, led by Sandy Alderson, looked for a way to help themselves. They developed their own system, their approach to "Guerilla baseball".

Others have pointed out the market inefficiencies that Oakland are trying to exploit. Another aspect worth reviewing is risk management. We know today that using a first round draft choice to select a high school pitcher is a risky move. Also the cost to develop a high school player was much higher. You had him in your system for three extra years and he had to be protected on the 40 man rester sooner. High school players were riskier and more expensive. In some cases the return from a high school player was higher but the return needed to be evaluated in a risk/return framework.

The Guerilla teams recognized that starting pitching was the most rare commodity in baseball. Free agent starting pitchers were overvalued and unaffordable to the poorer clubs. If you wanted to compete you had to develop your own rotation.

Managing players call-ups to the major leagues so as to optimize their value to the organization is also a new trend.


Jonny:

Thanks for participating, everybody. What does the Box say?